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RURAL LANDSCAPES AND RACE
Jessica A. Shoemaker*
Property law’s roots are rural. America pursued an early agrarian vision that
understood real property rights as instrumental to achieving a country of
free, engaged citizens who cared for their communities and stewarded their
physical place in it. But we have drifted far from this ideal. Today, American
agriculture is industrialized, and rural communities are in decline. The fee
simple ownership form has failed every agrarian objective but one: the
maintenance of white landownership. For it was also embedded in the origi-
nal American experiment that land ownership would be racialized for the
benefit of its white citizens, through acts of colonialism, slavery, and explicit
race-based exclusion in property law. Today, rather than undoing this racial-
ized legacy, modern property rules only further concentrate and homogenize
rural landownership. Agricultural landownership remains almost entirely—
98 percent—white. This is a critical racial justice issue that converges directly
with our impending environmental crisis and the decline of rural communi-
ties more generally.
This Article builds on work of rural sociologists and farm advocates who
demonstrate, again and again, that despite a pervasive narrative of rural places
dying for want of population and agricultural systems too far gone for re-
form, the reality is a crowd of emerging farmers—and farmers of color in par-
ticular—clamoring for access. Existing policy efforts to support beginning
farmers have focused primarily on supporting a few private land transactions
within existing systems. This Article brings property theory to the table for
the first time, arguing that property law itself is not only responsible for the
original racialized distributions of agricultural land but also actively perpet-
uates both ongoing racialized disparities and the currently industrialized and
depopulated rural landscape. This Article deconstructs our most fundamen-
tal land-tenure choice—the fee simple itself—and calls on our collective legal
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. I am most grateful to the
many farmers and farm advocates who let me into their community meetings, around their
kitchen tables, and in their fields—especially when I was a Skadden Fellow with Farmers’ Legal
Action Group, Inc., many years ago. I also benefited tremendously from feedback from Eric
Berger, Adam Calo, Lingxi Chenyang, Kathryn DeMaster, Ann Eisenberg, Jess Gilbert, Nicole
Graham, Hannah Haksgaard, Doug Harris, Megan McGuffey, Emily Prifogle, Lisa Pruitt, Ezra
Rosser, Anthony Schutz, Rebecca Tsosie, Ann Tweedy, and many other participants in events
hosted by the University of California–Davis, the Getches-Wilkinson Center at the University
of Colorado, the University of Nebraska College of Law, the University of South Dakota, the Ru-
ral Sociological Society, and the Big Ten Law School Speaker Series on Race, Law, and Equality.
Research funds from a McCollum Grant and the Rural Futures Institute helped support this
project, as did Aurora Kenworthy’s fantastic research assistance. Opinions and mistakes are mine.
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imagination to develop more adaptive, inclusive, and dynamic land-tenure
designs rooted in these otherwise overlooked rural places.
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“If you remember nothing else in your whole life, Cassie girl, remember this:
We ain’t never gonna lose this land. You believe that?” 1
“Most importantly, we might forget that the land beneath our feet holds
endless stories of struggle to claim it.” 2
“Land represents both a set of values and a store of wealth.” 3
INTRODUCTION
Property law bears a lot of responsibility. At its core, property is society’s
system for distributing valuable resources. 4 Through property law, we decide
who gets what and how our relationships around resources are defined and
managed. This constructive power of property law—to literally choose who
has and who has not—was deployed at our country’s birth to achieve a very
particular vision of American identity. 5 America deliberately rejected Eu-
rope’s history of feudalism, with its servient serfs working the inherited lands
of a dominant lord and its entrenched class system. 6 Instead, America
sought to build a society of equal opportunity and individual liberty, using
private property (and agricultural property in particular) as the key instru-
ment of this vision. 7 America offered individual homesteaders who invested
their agricultural labor in land the strongest and most complete set of property
rights imagined by law: the fee simple absolute. 8 With fee simple title, these
owners enjoyed broad rights to control, sell, lease, use, possess, develop, and
1. MILDRED D. TAYLOR, ROLL OF THUNDER, HEAR MY CRY 152 (1976).
2. NATASHA BOWENS, THE COLOR OF FOOD: STORIES OF RACE, RESILIENCE AND
FARMING 7, 9 (2015).
3. Katrina Quisumbing King, Spencer D. Wood, Jess Gilbert & Marilyn Sinkewicz,
Black Agrarianism: The Significance of African American Landownership in the Rural South, 83
RURAL SOCIO. 677, 677 (2018).
4. See generally Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1471 (2013).
5. See Jim Chen, Of Agriculture’s First Disobedience and Its Fruit, 48 VAND. L. REV.
1261, 1276–78 (1995) (emphasizing centrality of agricultural development in original coloniza-
tion and settlement of United States); ALLAN GREER, PROPERTY AND DISPOSSESSION: NATIVES,
EMPIRES AND LAND IN EARLY MODERN NORTH AMERICA (2018) (exploring early American
property choices).
6. See Chen, supra note 5, at 1274–86; Anna di Robilant, Populist Property Law, 49
CONN. L. REV. 933, 951 (2017) (outlining history of landless farmers pursuing homesteading as
progressive land reform and framing ultimate outcome as antifeudal).
7. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1317, 1352–54,
1356 & n.202, 1375 n.275 (1993).
8. See Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 §§ 2, 4–5 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. §§ 161–284) (repealed 1976).
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exclude others from a specific bounded space on the earth’s surface—into per-
petuity. 9
The fee simple was designed to construct a specific set of social and eco-
nomic incentives. 10 The land’s owner—the original hardworking farmer—
would profit directly from his own individual effort and investment. With
secure, perpetual rights to a defined physical space, fee title also aspired to
strengthen commitments to place and community. As an invested owner,
the new farmer would be motivated to steward the land well for the future
and to connect deeply with the surrounding community where land is locat-
ed. 11 By distributing clear, exclusive property rights to widely dispersed indi-
viduals, the fee simple would give rise to a uniquely engaged group of
landowning, enfranchised citizens, forming a more perfect republic. 12
Or at least a more perfect republic for the chosen beneficiaries, because
American agrarianism was also always explicitly coded in both gender and
race. 13 America’s western expansion was a project of race-based exclusion
and control, using colonialism, slavery, and other blatantly racialized tactics
to ensure that private landownership emerged in the image of the white yeo-
man-farmer ideal. 14 Indigenous land rights were displaced, in part because
of a failure to recognize the value of Native agricultural practices and often
the work of Native women in particular.15 Instead, Native land claims were
reimagined as a weaker property fiction called “Indian title”—a limited right
9. JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MICHAEL H. SCHILL &
LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, PROPERTY 254 n.9 (9th ed. 2018) (identifying the fee simple as “the
greatest modern estate known to law”).
10. See Katrina M. Wyman, In Defense of the Fee Simple, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 33–
38 (2017).
11. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
12. See Jim Chen & Edward S. Adams, Feudalism Unmodified: Discourses on Farms and
Firms, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 361, 371–80 (1997).
13. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, [Re]Integrating Spaces: The Color of Farming, 2 SAVANNAH
L. REV. 157 (2015) (analyzing all that is encoded in American agriculture, including in iconic im-
ages like the American Gothic painting); Chen, supra note 5, at 1276 (framing original constitu-
tional choices about slavery as a “nakedly economic boost” to “certain farm interests”).
14. See Harris, supra note 13, at 1276 (revealing racialization of agrarian visions). The
New Deal famously “modernized the concept of Jeffersonian democracy by broadening it to
include homeowners in an industrial society as well as the idealized yeoman farmer,” but again
in racialized ways. Florence Wagman Roisman, Teaching About Inequality, Race, and Property,
46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 665, 676 (2002) (quoting Arnold R. Hirsch, Choosing Segregation: Federal
Housing Policy Between Shelley and Brown, in FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR HOMES 206,
208 (John F. Bauman, Roger Biles & Kristin M. Szylvian eds., 2000)).
15. See Joseph William Singer, Original Acquisition of Property: From Conquest & Pos-
session to Democracy & Equal Opportunity, 86 IND. L.J. 763, 773 (2011) (“We cannot trace our
land titles to a just origin, and we should stop pretending we can.”); Carol M. Rose, Possession
as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 87 (1985); Allison M. Dussias, Squaw Drudges,
Farm Wives, and the Dann Sisters’ Last Stand: American Indian Women’s Resistance to Domes-
tication and the Denial of Their Property Rights, 77 N.C. L. REV. 637 (1999).
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of occupancy subject to one-way extinguishment by the federal government.16
At the same time, enslaved people came to America treated as property and
were forced to build and run the wealth-generating plantations of white agri-
culturalists.17 Meanwhile, westward expansion across the new country was
driven by allocation of homestead rights almost exclusively to white men. 18
The result is an agrarian vision that still underlies so much of our na-
tional identity—the heroic, hardworking, wholesome (and almost certainly,
white and male) farmer. 19 It is no accident that today 98 percent of agricul-
tural lands remain owned and controlled by people who are white. 20 Nor is it
accidental that some of this country’s most notorious and persistent regions
of concentrated poverty are both rural and racialized: the farming Black Belt
of the Southeast, the Hispanic colonias along the southern border, and the
Native American reservations of the Southwest and Upper Midwest. 21
This is a complex story with many threads. In 2020, America is experi-
encing massive protests for racial justice. Much of this energy is centered on
responses to police brutality in urban settings, but 2020 also brought us
frightening coronavirus clusters among workers at highly industrialized—
and rural—meatpacking plants and in tightly packed buses transporting mi-
grant farmworkers from one enormous commercial field to another. 22 The
16. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588–90 (1823) (defining Indige-
nous peoples of the United States as “fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose
subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest” and justifying European colonial disposses-
sion and displacement on the basis that Indigenous peoples would “leave the country a wil-
derness”); see also infra Section II.A.
17. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 411 (1857) (enslaved party) (de-
fining African slaves as “articles of merchandise” not eligible for the benefits of citizenship),
superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness
as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1716 (1993); see also infra Section II.C.
18. Some women and farmers of color did achieve homesteading status, albeit in dis-
proportionately low numbers and often impermanently. See infra Section II.D.
19. “America has moved to the city, but the romantic imagination of its law still lives on
the farm.” Chen & Adams, supra note 12, at 371. For many, the farmer is still the person who
feeds America, who stewards a critical landscape, who drives a weathered truck to Sunday
church suppers and Friday night high-school football games. See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Rural
Venue, 57 ALA. L. REV. 941, 958–61 (2006) (collecting evidence of positive stereotypes for rural
landscapes as scenic and rural lifestyles as charming and community oriented). But the story is
getting complicated. Others now see farmers as responsible for the 2016 election of President
Donald Trump and recipients of rich farm subsidies and financial support denied to other
Americans. See, e.g., Rick Su, Democracy in Rural America, 98 N.C. L. REV. 837, 838–39 (2020);
Bassett, supra, at 969 (collecting evidence of rural residents stereotyped negatively as close-
minded, irrational, and naive).
20. See infra Section I.A.
21. See infra Section I.B.
22. See, e.g., Mike Dorning & Jen Skerritt, Every Single Worker Has Covid at One U.S.
Farm on Eve of Harvest, BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2020-05-29/every-single-worker-has-covid-at-one-u-s-farm-on-eve-of-
harvest [https://perma.cc/T4D6-WCCN] (noting example of one Tennessee farm where every
single one of roughly 200 workers was infected with COVID-19); Nina Lakhani, US Corona-
virus Hotspots Linked to Meat Processing Plants, GUARDIAN (May 15, 2020, 7:45 AM),
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workers getting sick in these plants and fields are overwhelmingly nonwhite,
and many are vulnerable both in immigration and economic status. 23
These COVID outbreaks underline other truths about the actual state of
American agriculture. We have drifted far from our original stewardship
ideals. American agriculture is dramatically industrialized and concentrated
in the hands of a few powerful operators. 24 Meanwhile, rural communities
have emptied as self-supporting, middle-class farmers disappear. 25 Farm-
lands are increasingly owned by fewer and more powerful landowners who
manage operations, if at all, from a distance. 26 Indeed, many of the modern
production contract arrangements and tenant farm dynamics that character-
ize our food-production system now look a lot more like the feudal systems
the fee simple was supposed to prevent. 27 Although a significant group of
new farmers and ranchers—disproportionately members of disadvantaged
groups—wait in the wings with new commitments to sustainability and di-
versification, these potential innovators consistently cite an inability to access
farmland as their number-one barrier. 28 Experts predict that as many as half
of American farm acres will change hands in the next two decades; without a
radical course correction, these acres are destined for pension funds, foreign
investors, and even greater concentration in the hands of absentee landlords. 29
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/15/us-coronavirus-meat-packing-plants-food
[https://perma.cc/UPD8-QLLP] (identifying meat processing plants as “incubators for the
coronavirus,” with high infection rates both among employees and USDA inspectors who ac-
tively monitor these plants); see also Tim Marema, The Rural Counties with Highest Rate of
New Infections, DAILY YONDER (June 15, 2020), https://dailyyonder.com/new-infections-hit-
counties-with-meatpacking-plants-prisons-and-non-white-populations/2020/06/15 [https://
perma.cc/NJG7-J54H] (identifying meatpacking plants as “largest single factor in Covid-19
hotspots in rural America” but noting that “unifying characteristic” of rural counties hardest
hit by COVID-19 “is that they are home to large numbers of non-whites,” including in some
counties’ prison populations).
23. Art Cullen, Opinion, Why Is Trump Insisting that Meat-Packing Plants Stay Open De-
spite Risks?, GUARDIAN (May 1, 2020, 7:31 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree
/2020/may/01/trump-meat-processing-executive-order-workers [https://perma.cc/WRT2-HSVU]
(“Thousands of workers stream in single file, at dawn and mid-afternoon, to suit up in masks
and chain gloves and put their lives on the line so you can put cheap sausage on your biscuit.”).
At least 60 percent of U.S. farm workers are in poverty, five times the national average. SOPHIE
ACKOFF, ANDREW BAHRENBURG & LINDSEY LUSHER SHUTE, NAT’L YOUNG FARMERS COAL.,
BUILDING A FUTURE WITH FARMERS II: RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE
NATIONAL YOUNG FARMER SURVEY 48 (2017), https://www.youngfarmers.org/wp-content
/uploads/2019/03/NYFC-Report-2017_LoRes_Revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/64EG-MZ33].
24. See infra Section III.B.2.
25. See infra Section III.B.2.
26. See infra Sections III.B.1, III.B.3.
27. See, e.g., Chen & Adams, supra note 12, at 384.
28. See infra Section I.C.
29. See infra notes 92–93, 193–196 and accompanying text.
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So, where is property law in this? In this Article, I argue that property
law is right at the heart of it. 30 In the beginning, a series of property-law
choices systematically excluded people of color from original agricultural
landownership. 31 This original sin of racialized exclusion still stains the en-
tire project of American property law, but it does not end with those unfair
advantages and disadvantages. Our property system is still designed to keep
property in these racialized patterns. 32 The surprising thing may be how
many of these original property features are now turning on white rural resi-
dents too, as property law has no response to the ongoing industrialization
and exploitation of rural landscapes more generally. 33
It is important to recognize these features of property law as what they
are: choices. It is possible to imagine a different set of ownership institutions
that produce more just, equitable, and sustainable rural outcomes. Outside
of the rural context, property scholarship is doing good work by critically
reexamining the fee simple itself. Ironically, much of this work has empha-
sized, as its predicate, how “not-rural” property law has become and suggest-
ed changes to the fee simple in light of specific changed conditions: growing
wealth inequality outside of land ownership, 34 the increasingly urban nature
of many high-density housing concerns, 35 and the potential for dramatic en-
vironmental and climate change globally. 36 Some of this work has stressed
the fact that land use in modern society is “overwhelmingly urban.” 37
Whereas the fee simple was originally designed for an agrarian society which
land value was derived primarily from the land’s ability to produce goods
30. To be clear, my argument is not that property is the only factor of concern. All new
entrants to agriculture face a range of challenges, including navigating complex federal farm
and credit programs, supplying labor and equipment, accessing tightened markets with narrow
profit margins, and needing sophisticated and complex knowledge for both the financial and
physical acts of managing a farm with attendant weather, climate, and other risks. My argu-
ment is that core features of property design also contribute significantly to these challenges in
ways that have been fundamentally overlooked.
31. See K-Sue Park, Conquest and Slavery as Foundational to Property Law, SSRN 4 (Feb.
22, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3793972 [https://perma.cc/9GRK-9EAT] (“[H]istories of
conquest and the slave trade . . . . present more than an opportunity for apology or condemna-
tion. They are essential to understanding what American property is and how it has been con-
structed by law.”). Indigenous dispossession and slavery, however, are only two of many core
choices that have racialized American property law. See infra Part II.
32. Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 107, 111–12 (2013) (arguing that even progressive property scholars have failed to
adequately account for race-based acquisition and distribution of property in the United States).
33. See, e.g., Stephen Carpenter, Family Farm Advocacy and Rebellious Lawyering, 24
CLINICAL L. REV. 79, 94 n.51 (2017) (describing ongoing economic crisis for many family
farmers, including persistent poverty and disproportionate wealth and income inequality).
34. ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND
DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY (2018).
35. Lee Anne Fennell, Fee Simple Obsolete, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1457 (2016).
36. John G. Sprankling, Property Law for the Anthropocene Era, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 737
(2017).
37. Fennell, supra note 35, at 1459–61.
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within the physical boundaries of the property itself, in urban settings land
value is more likely tied to the property’s location within a web of other
dense, interconnected land users.
The aim of this Article is to explore the many ways the fee simple is not
working for rural landscapes either. Here are two examples. The first stems
from the fee simple’s endlessness. 38 Although perpetual property rights were
originally intended to encourage owner investment, security, and place-
based attachment, in practice, the fee simple’s endlessness has entrenched
familial and generational wealth. Endlessness, exacerbated by recent reforms
to make dynastic ownership and control easier to achieve, has entrenched
historic racial disparities and now further facilitates continued white land-
ownership—including in more concentrated and even absentee forms. As a
result, minority farmers who are already less likely to inherit farmlands be-
cause their ancestors were excluded from agricultural landownership also
face steep competition for increasingly valuable farmland assets. In this
competition for new land, minority farmers are also less likely to come to the
table with generational wealth (in part because of this same ancestral exclu-
sion) and more likely to face private discrimination in the transaction. 39
Second, the fee simple’s ever-increasing construction as an abstract set
of profit rights facilitates a commodified form of ownership separate and
apart from the physical experience of the land itself. 40 Rather than tying peo-
ple to physical spaces for stewardship and deep community engagement, as
originally intended, modern property rules have evolved to condone dramatic
gaps between legal landownership and the physical experience of agriculture.
This is facilitated, in part, by the conception of the fee simple estate as a bun-
dle of rights and a predominantly economic layer of relationships over—and
apart from—the physical space itself. 41 Rather than rooted, the fee simple is
increasingly abstract, disembodied, and commodified, allowing for the frac-
turing and scattering of profit rights for investment and wealth accumulation
apart from the (increasingly marginalized) day-to-day work of farming. 42
What if at least some rural property rights were instead tied to actual
possession and use? What if property access were framed more deeply as a
relationship to community, combined with responsibilities to tread gently on
the land as a citizen of place? What if we reimagined rural property altogeth-
er? This Article proceeds to do just that in four parts. In Part I, I provide a
38. Id. at 1480, 1489 (using frame of “endlessness” and “rootedness” to define fee sim-
ple’s core design features).
39. See infra Section III.A.
40. See Claire Priest, Creating an American Property Law: Alienability and Its Limits in
American History, 120 HARV. L. REV. 385, 387 (2006) (identifying early American property
reforms that allowed, in some ways, the “legal treatment of land as a substitute for money”).
41. See Claire Priest, The End of Entail: Information, Institutions, and Slavery in the
American Revolutionary Period, 33 L. & HIST. REV. 277, 280 (2015) (exploring how antifeudal,
pro-alienability property reforms led to increased risk for smallholders and how inalienable
estates like the fee tail “might have buffered against land consolidation”).
42. See infra Section III.B.
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snapshot of land ownership, poverty, and racial dynamics in today’s rural
America, emphasizing the demands for, and the possibilities of, this kind of
radical reimagining. In Part II, I briefly explore some of the historic roots of
these modern racial disparities, revealing the specific ways property law cre-
ated a white rural landowning class in the first place. In Part III, I decon-
struct the fee simple, revealing how features such as endlessness,
abstractness, and racialized apportionment of security and vulnerability pro-
duce and reproduce a rural landscape that benefits only a chosen few. Final-
ly, in Part IV, I begin to imagine a series of land reforms—some on the edges
of property law doctrine, some more major—that could help address some of
the current challenges.
These initial seeds for more experimental agricultural land reforms are
offered with two key caveats in mind. First, property system change is diffi-
cult and messy and tends to happen in long, slow cycles—driven best by
grassroots momentum and adaptation. 43 Second, I recognize that many im-
pacted farmers worry, rightly, about outsiders “introducing solutions for
communities they have never lived in or fields they have never plowed.” 44
Although I have spent a fair amount of time in farm fields, I am neither a
farmer nor a person of color. So my purpose, very intentionally, is not to
prescribe universal reforms but rather to bring the work of property theory
and design to these issues in new and creative ways. The primary goal is to
“open our imagination to the possibility that things can be different” and
then, liberated from existing property rituals and languages, to create space
to let those new imaginings “dance on the table.” 45
I. A SNAPSHOT OF RURAL LANDSCAPES TODAY
To engage more deeply with these land-tenure dynamics, this Part be-
gins with a brief overview of the modern rural landscape, with an emphasis
on rural America’s racialized geography and wealth distribution. 46 The first
Section focuses on the current status of agricultural landownership, includ-
ing its shocking racialization and ongoing consolidation. The second Section
addresses other important rural demographics, including the close correla-
43. See, e.g., Jessica A. Shoemaker, Transforming Property: Reclaiming Indigenous Land
Tenures, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1531 (2019) (discussing property system change in light of com-
plex systems theory and other histories of property evolution and dynamic design).
44. BOWENS, supra note 2, at 4.
45. See A.J. van der Walt, Dancing with Codes—Protecting, Developing and Deconstruct-
ing Property Rights in a Constitutional State, 118 S. AFRICAN L.J. 258, 263 (2001).
46. My analysis here does not depend on granular distinctions between rural and urban
place classifications, but I acknowledge at the outset that definitions of what constitutes “rural”
is itself a subject of significant debate. See Lisa R. Pruitt, Rural Rhetoric, 39 CONN. L. REV. 159,
177–84 (2006) (discussing many various metrics for defining “rural”); see also MICHAEL
RATCLIFFE, CHARLYNN BURD, KELLY HOLDER & ALISON FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, REPORT
NO. ACSGEO-1, DEFINING RURAL AT THE U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2016), https://www.census
.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/acs/acsgeo-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UB7-
TVVX].
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tion between concentrated poverty and minority status in rural places. Final-
ly, at the end of this Part, I address whether reform in such dire circumstanc-
es is possible, highlighting examples of the many aspiring farmers and
ranchers who stand ready to hold us to our better values and forge a new
way forward.
A. Who Owns Agricultural Land
Start with the land. Agricultural land makes up roughly one-half of the
physical landscape of the contiguous United States. 47 The United States De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA) reports that there are 911 million acres of
agricultural lands in the lower forty-eight states, including both crop and
pasture or grazing land. 48 Approximately two-thirds of privately owned
farmland are operated by the landowner directly, while the remaining one-
third or so is rented out for use by others. 49
Ownership of private farm acres is extremely racialized. White farmers
“own and operate nearly all of the agricultural land in the United States,”
and the farms they own and operate are larger than those of nonwhite farm-
ers and landowners. 50 Overall, 96% of farmers who own their own lands
(owner-operators) are white. 51 Whites also make up 97% of agricultural
landlords, that is, landowners who rent their lands to others to farm (nonop-
erating landowners). 52 Focusing more closely on total acres owned (rather
than the number of individual farmers and landowners), whites own a stag-
gering 98% of agricultural land and operate 94% of farmland. 53 White land-
47. Cynthia Nickerson & Allison Borchers, How Is Land in the United States Used? A
Focus on Agricultural Land, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.: AMBER WAVES (Mar. 1, 2012)
https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2012/march/data-feature-how-is-land-used
[https://perma.cc/TF2R-37RH] (noting 51% of U.S. land base in agricultural use in 2007).
48. DANIEL BIGELOW, ALLISON BORCHERS & TODD HUBBS, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., EIB-
161, U.S. FARMLAND OWNERSHIP, TENURE, AND TRANSFER (2016) [hereinafter BIGELOW ET AL.,
U.S. FARMLAND OWNERSHIP], https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/74672/eib-161.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3WP3-ZTTE]. This is a lot of land. By comparison, urban land uses encompass
69.4 million acres. DANIEL P. BIGELOW & ALLISON BORCHERS, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., EIB-178,
MAJOR USES OF LAND IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012 (2017), https://permanent.fdlp.gov
/gpo136511/eib-178.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QVQ-ZSVP]. Another 538.6 million acres (or rough-
ly a quarter of the contiguous United States) is forest and timber. Id. The federal government
manages roughly 250 million acres of pasture and rangeland. See CAROL HARDY VINCENT, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., RS21232, GRAZING FEES: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 29 (2019), https://crsreports
.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21232/31 [https://perma.cc/4NF3-4LQ5].
49. Megan Horst & Amy Marion, Racial, Ethnic and Gender Inequities in Farmland
Ownership and Farming in the U.S., 36 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 1, 5 (2018). A clear majority of
private lands (61%, 557 million acres) are still owned and operated by the same person or enti-
ty (“owner-operated”), while the remaining 39% (353 million acres) are rented. BIGELOW ET
AL., U.S. FARMLAND OWNERSHIP, supra note 48, at 15.
50. Horst & Marion, supra note 49, at 9.
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 9.
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owners who rent, but do not farm, their land also account for 98% of rent
received and 98% of the value of rented lands and buildings. 54
It is difficult to find good historical data for near-term comparison, but a
1999 USDA survey (distinguishable, in part, because it includes Hawaii and
Alaska while other data do not) indicated that of all privately owned agricul-
tural land, “[w]hites account[ed] for 96 percent of the owners, 97 percent of
the value, and 98 percent of the acres.” 55 In the past, however, farmers and
ranchers of color owned more land. Although exact numbers are hard to
pinpoint, most estimates suggest that post-Reconstruction Black farmers
managed to acquire up to 19 million acres of farmland. 56 Today, Black farm-
ers own fewer than 3 million acres and operate only 0.4% of U.S. farmland. 57
This is all part of a larger pattern of increased land insecurity—and contin-
ued, legally facilitated land loss—for nonwhite owners. 58
And yet, despite whites owning and controlling almost all the agricul-
tural land in the United States, there are two other important trends to note.
First, as discussed in more detail below, although whites as a group have
maintained—and even increased—their relative share of farmland owner-
ship, the number of white farmers and landowners has decreased as land
ownership has concentrated. 59 The average farm size of 155 acres in 1935
ballooned to 444 acres in 2019. 60 Today, the top 8% of farms contain nearly
70% of all farmland. 61 Meanwhile, agricultural enterprises have consolidated
horizontally and integrated vertically, and outside investors—including pri-
vate investment funds and even foreign countries—are increasingly looking
to purchase farmland. 62
54. NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARMLAND OWNERSHIP AND
TENURE: RESULTS FROM THE 2014 TENURE, OWNERSHIP, AND TRANSITION OF AGRICULTURAL
LAND SURVEY 3 (2015), https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2015
/TOTAL_Highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/647K-TLQD]. These white landlords also had 99%
of the debt (evidencing their access to credit) in 2014. Id.
55. Jess Gilbert, Spencer D. Wood & Gwen Sharp, Who Owns the Land? Agricultural
Land Ownership by Race/Ethnicity, 17 RURAL AM., Winter 2002, at 55, 59.
56. Id. at 55.
57. NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2017 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE 72
tbl.61 (2019) [hereinafter 2017 CENSUS], https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications
/AgCensus/2017/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_US/st99_1_0061_0061.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CY57-N4JL]; NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2012 CENSUS OF
AGRICULTURE HIGHLIGHTS: BLACK FARMERS 2 (2014), https://www.nass.usda.gov
/Publications/Highlights/2014/Highlights_Black_Farmers.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KY5-2SQF].
58. See infra Part II (describing additional histories of dispossession); Section II.C.3
(discussing modern racialized land insecurity).
59. See infra Section III.B.2 (discussing modern land concentration trends).
60. Econ. Rsch. Serv., Farms, Land in Farms, and Average Acres per Farm, 1850–2019,
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-
gallery/gallery/chart-detail/?chartId=58268 [https://perma.cc/G32F-A246].
61. BIGELOW ET AL., U.S. FARMLAND OWNERSHIP, supra note 48, at 18.
62. See infra Section III.B.2.
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Second, despite these obstacles, the number of principal farm operators
who are minorities is actually growing—from approximately 132,100 minor-
ity principal operators in 2007 to 151,900 in 2012. 63 Yet, in relative terms,
this remains a tiny percentage of the total number of farm operators. In
2007, minority principal operators made up just under 6% of all principal
farm operators. 64 In 2012, the number grew to just over 7%. 65 These minori-
ty-operated farms also fell disproportionately into the group of farms with
less than $10,000 in annual sales. 66 Because they are largely locked out of
farmland ownership now, these minority farmers are much more likely to be
tenant farmers (working land they do not own). 67 People of color make up
14% of tenant farmers, but they earn only 3% of tenant-earned farm in-
come. 68 In contrast, although white farmers are a smaller proportion of ten-
ant farmers, they operate a whopping 92% of tenant-operated farmland. 69
Finally, as agricultural operations have consolidated and industrialized,
racial minorities also make up 62% of farm laborers. 70 Focusing on ethnicity
rather than race, as many as 80% of farm laborers are Hispanic. 71 Other re-
ports indicate three-quarters of American farm workers are immigrants, 72
63. NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE
HIGHLIGHTS: FARM DEMOGRAPHICS 3 fig.4 (2014), https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications
/Highlights/2014/Farm_Demographics/Highlights_Farm_Demographics.pdf [https://perma.cc
/Z85V-86NY].
64. See id. at 1 tbl.1, 3 fig.4.
65. See id. at 3 fig.4.
66. Id. at 3 tbl.6. While 56.6% of all farms have annual sales less than $10,000, 68.4% of
Hispanic operators, 78.1% of American Indian operators, and 78.9% of Black operators fall
within this group. Id. Only Asian-operated farms tend to be larger, with 26.8% of Asian-
operated farms having annuals sales over $100,000 compared to only 18.4% of all farms regard-
less of operator race. Id. This may, however, account for contract-farming operations. See
NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE:
RACE/ETHNICITY/GENDER PROFILE (2012), https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus
/2012/Online_Resources/Race,_Ethnicity_and_Gender_Profiles/cpd99000.pdf [http://perma.cc
/2TFV-DJFY] (showing the number of minority-operated farms with sales less than $10,000).
67. See infra Section III.C.3.c (discussing consequences of disproportionate leasing rates).
68. Horst & Marion, supra note 49, at 7 tbl.1, 11.
69. Id. at 9.
70. Id. at 7 tbl.1.
71. Id. The difference between racial and ethnic identities for Hispanic Americans is a
persistent challenge. The U.S. government defines racial categories as only “white, black, Asian,
American Indian or Pacific Islander” and defines “Hispanic” as an ethnicity, not a race. Ana
Gonzalez-Barrera & Mark Hugo Lopez, Is Being Hispanic a Matter of Race, Ethnicity or Both?,
PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACT TANK (June 15, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015
/06/15/is-being-hispanic-a-matter-of-race-ethnicity-or-both [https://perma.cc/45TW-LC7M].
72. Dorning & Skerritt, supra note 22 (“Unlike grain crops that rely on machinery,
America’s fruits and vegetables are mostly picked and packed by hand, in long shifts out in the
open—a typically undesirable job in major economies. So the position typically goes to immi-
grants, who make up about three quarters of U.S. farm workers.”).
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and the U.S. Department of Labor has estimated that nearly half of all farm
workers are vulnerable in immigration status. 73
B. Rural Demographics: Race, Geography, and Poverty
These land realities connect closely to other demographic trends in rural
America. First, as farms have gotten bigger and land ownership more con-
solidated, rural populations have dramatically declined. 74 This decline has
occurred over the last century as Americans move to urban centers, but it
may be accelerating. 75 As of July 2016, 46.1 million people—or 14% of the
total U.S. population—live in rural or nonmetropolitan places, on 72% of the
country’s land mass. 76
Overall, tracking somewhat the distribution of agricultural landowner-
ship, the people who live in rural places are disproportionately white. 77 Yet,
somewhat surprisingly, while overall rural populations are declining, people
of color are migrating into rural places. 78 The dispersion of these new rural
minority residents, however, has been uneven and highly segregated. 79 Much
of the Hispanic growth, for example, has been linked with specific meat pro-
cessing or meatpacking plants, which disproportionately employ Hispanics
“to do the ‘dirty work.’ ” 80 Rather than a positive story of new racial inclusion
73. See TRISH HERNANDEZ, SUSAN GABBARD & DANIEL CARROLL, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB.,
FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS SURVEY (NAWS) 2013–2014, at 4–5
(2016) (presenting lack of work authorization figures), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files
/ETA/naws/pdfs/NAWS_Research_Report_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QCE-9PBX].
74. See generally John Cromartie, Rural Areas Show Overall Population Decline and Shift-
ing Regional Patterns of Population Change, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.: AMBER WAVES (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2017/september/rural-areas-show-overall-population-
decline-and-shifting-regional-patterns-of-population-change [https://perma.cc/Y8AB-GTGJ]
(noting that natural population growth in rural America is no longer sufficient to offset net
migration losses).
75. For the first time in 2016, the aggregate rural population across all counties declined,
with growth from natural change (births minus deaths) insufficient to offset total out-
migration losses; this rebounded slightly in 2017. Id.
76. Id.
77. HOSSEIN AYAZI & ELSADIG ELSHEIKH, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, HAAS INST., THE
US FARM BILL: CORPORATE POWER AND STRUCTURAL RACIALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES
FOOD SYSTEM 59 (2015), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/55v6q06x [https://perma.cc/S8MC-
7YJ5]. Rural communities also have a larger proportion of white residents (78%) than urban
communities do (64%). Id.
78. Daniel T. Lichter, Immigration and the New Racial Diversity in Rural America, 77
RURAL SOCIO. 3, 7 (2012) (noting increase of minority rural residents from 8.6 million in 2000
to 10.3 million in 2010, while proportion of rural white residents simultaneously decreased).
79. Id. at 8.
80. Id. at 10. A map of the racial demographics of Nebraska shows nearly all of the small
towns west of Lincoln have predominantly white populations, but a few—Schuyler, Crete,
parts of Grand Island—are noticeably and even predominantly Hispanic. Dustin A. Smith,
Weldon Cooper Ctr. for Pub. Serv., Racial Dot Map, UNIV. VA., https://demographics
.virginia.edu/DotMap/index.html [https://perma.cc/5X67-TNP7]. These Hispanic popula-
tions—orange dots on my classroom screen—track, in glaring relief, the locations of large beef-
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and progress, many scholars currently see “a new kind of racial and ethnic
balkanization over geographic space . . . and perhaps growing social distance
and greater intolerance between minority and majority populations in some
fast-growing rural places.” 81
Poverty in rural places also tends to be geographically concentrated and
racially segregated. Rural racial minorities are two to three times more likely
to be poor than rural whites, 82 and there is a “similarly extreme difference in
the degree to which [minority] group members experience spatially concen-
trated poverty, that is, live among large numbers of other poor people in
what are effectively rural ghettos.” 83
This spatially concentrated poverty also takes on a familiar geography
across the country. Although the U.S. rural landscape is overwhelmingly
white, the noticeably nonwhite exceptions are clearly concentrated and ra-
cialized regional geographies which are also, by no coincidence, some of the
most well-known areas of persistent, concentrated rural poverty: the “Black
Belt” of the Southeast, the “Borderlands” of the South and Southwest (where
more than half of all rural Hispanics reside), and Native American reserva-
tions in the Southwest and Upper Midwest. 84 In light of these dynamics, ru-
ral sociologists have concluded that “discussions and analyses of poverty
concentration in rural America cannot be separated from the issue of
race.” 85
processing plants. To take one example: Schuyler, Nebraska, is a town of just over 6,000 de-
pendent on the Cargill beef-processing plant as its single largest employer, and it is nearly 70%
Hispanic or Latino. DACA Causes Economic Concerns in Some Small Nebraska Towns like
Schuyler, 3 NEWS NOW (Sept. 21, 2017, 12:36 AM), https://www.3newsnow.com/news/local-
news/daca-causes-economic-concerns-in-some-small-nebraska-towns-like-schuyler
[https://perma.cc/9X39-V438]. See generally Rochelle L. Dalla, Francisco Villarruel, Sheran C.
Cramer & Gloria Gonzalez-Kruger, Examining Strengths and Challenges of Rapid Rural Immi-
gration, 14 GREAT PLAINS RSCH. 231 (2004) (assessing rapid growth of Hispanic population in
Nebraska in relation to meatpacking-industry employment).
81. Lichter, supra note 78, at 9; see also Domenico Parisi, Daniel T. Lichter & Michael C.
Taquino, Multi-scale Residential Segregation: Black Exceptionalism and America’s Changing
Color Line, 89 SOC. FORCES 829 (2011); Lisa R. Pruitt, Latina/os, Locality, and Law in the Rural
South, 12 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 135 (2009).
82. Mark H. Harvey, Racial Inequalities and Poverty in Rural America, in RURAL
POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 141, 141 (Ann R. Tickamyer, Jennifer Sherman & Jennifer
Warlick eds., 2017).
83. Id. at 146.
84. Id. at 147. The predominately white Appalachian region is also a region where white
rural poverty is concentrated. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
85. Daniel T. Lichter & Kenneth M. Johnson, The Changing Spatial Concentration of
America’s Rural Poor Population, 72 RURAL SOCIO. 331, 334 (2007). Sadly, this is not new, and
many rural sociologists have noted that “rural America has an especially entrenched history of
racism.” Michael Kimmel & Abby L. Ferber, “White Men Are This Nation:” Right-Wing Mili-
tias and the Restoration of Rural American Masculinity, 65 RURAL SOCIO. 582, 591 (2000); see
also C. Matthew Snipp, Understanding Race and Ethnicity in Rural America, 61 RURAL SOCIO.
125, 126–27 (1996) (explaining that “[r]acial segregation is as much a reality in the American
countryside as it is in the cities” and that, on top of profound poverty, minority rural communi-
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There are numerous factors contributing to the persistent and dispro-
portionate poverty of rural minorities. Exclusion from equitable farming and
farmland ownership opportunities is clearly one factor. But other aspects of
rural property ownership, including home ownership, are also tied to race.
Although rural residents in general are much more likely to own homes than
their urban counterparts, rural minorities are much less likely to own a
home (50–55%) than rural white residents (75%). 86
C. Why This Matters (and Is Change Possible?)
As rural communities board up their town squares, the environmental
consequences of industrialized agriculture become clearer, and minority res-
idents move to rural places for low-wage agricultural work that keeps them
poor, one has to ask: Is there a different way?
Agriculture is “the most palpable link between humanity and nature”
and, as such, is “a stark mirror of human values.” 87 It is also true that mod-
ern agriculture is an enormously complex and deeply entrenched human
and physical system. In some ways, it all just feels too far gone at this point
in our development to turn the ship around in transformational ways. 88 At
the same time, it is a fair question to ask whether we should care about the
future of rural communities at all. Perhaps the urbanization of American
and the industrialization of the countryside is inevitable. Even if we decide to
care about rural communities, how do we decide which ones? Is it enough to
emphasize that real people—drawn to or left in these places after generations
of wealth and resource extraction, driven by our collective policy choices—
are suffering? 89
One of the best things that can be said about our current system of agri-
culture is that it produces a lot of food. 90 The United States produces more
food than any other country. Yet, one in seven Americans are food inse-
ties “share the experience of living in close proximity to the historical remnants of institutions
explicitly created to conquer, oppress, and maintain their subordinate position in society”).
86. JON BAILEY ET AL., CTR. FOR SOC. DEV., WASH. UNIV. IN ST. LOUIS, WEALTH
BUILDING IN RURAL AMERICA: PROGRAMS, POLICIES, RESEARCH 48 (2006),
https://doi.org/10.7936/K7R49Q7P [https://perma.cc/KWE3-JGDR]; AYAZI & ELSHEIKH, supra
note 77, at 59. Housing quality in rural communities is also often substandard, with limited (if
any) wealth-building benefits. BAILEY ET AL., supra, at 48–52 (describing proliferation of rural
mobile homes with depreciating values).
87. Chen, supra note 5, at 1262; see also Eric Holt-Giménez, Agrarian Questions and the
Struggle for Land Justice in the United States, in LAND JUSTICE: RE-IMAGINING LAND, FOOD,
AND THE COMMONS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (Justine M. Williams & Eric Holt-Giménez eds.,
2017) (blaming the “US’s agrarian transition” for a host of social ills across the country).
88. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing litany of new farmer challenges).
89. See Ann M. Eisenberg, Distributive Justice and Rural America, 61 B.C. L. REV. 189,
228–29 (2020) (outlining pattern of urban-majoritarian choices that “effectuated a grand sacri-
fice of rural communities”).
90. Cf. Chen & Adams, supra note 12 (suggesting industrialization of agricultural is
natural, even desirable, evolution).
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cure—and people of color, women, children, and those working in the food
sector are among the most impacted. 91
There are two other key facts essential to this conversation: First, the age
of current (white) farmers and landowners is increasing, and experts esti-
mate that 10% of U.S. agricultural land—or roughly 100 million acres—will
change hands over the next five years based on natural aging events. 92 Other
estimates suggest nearly two-thirds of farmland will “need a new farmer over
the next two and a half decades as older farmers retire.” 93 This transition—
from current owners to new owners—is going to happen no matter what the
law does or does not do. Our choice is whether this transition is an oppor-
tunity to build something new or a ramp to more of the same. 94
Second, there are a lot of people who want to farm but are locked out by
a range of factors, especially by the current land system. 95 The National
Young Farmers Coalition (NYFC) recently surveyed 3,517 “aspiring, cur-
rent, and former farmers” under 40 years old in the United States; 60% were
women and 75% were from nonfarming families. 96 These young farmers are
also disproportionately farmers and ranchers of color and Indigenous—at
nearly twice the rate of farmers in the 2012 Census of Agriculture. 97 These
young farmers consistently identify access to land as their top challenge by a
significant margin. 98 NYFC also identifies racial inequity in agriculture as a
threshold concern that limits opportunity for young farmers in the United
States. 99 This corresponds with other evidence that “[i]ncreasingly, begin-
91. Holt-Giménez, supra note 87, at 9; see also BOWENS, supra note 2, at 18–19.
92. ADAM CALO & MARGIANA PETERSEN-ROCKNEY, BERKELEY FOOD INST., WHAT
BEGINNING FARMERS NEED MOST IN THE NEXT FARM BILL: LAND 1 (2018),
https://food.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/BFI-Beginning-Farmers-Policy-
Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DWN-T9NQ]. The 2017 agriculture census reports there are 1.15
million producers aged 65 and over, compared to only 285,000 under the age of 35. 2017
CENSUS, supra note 57, at 62 tbl.52.
93. Land Access, NAT’L YOUNG FARMERS COAL., https://www.youngfarmers.org/land-
access/ [https://perma.cc/PH9A-W79P]; see also ACKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 18.
94. See infra notes 193–198 and accompanying text (discussing predictions of future
inheritance and transfer patterns under current law).
95. See, e.g., Jillian Forstadt, ‘Make Farmers Black Again’: African Americans Fight Dis-
crimination to Own Farmland, NPR (Aug. 25, 2020, 5:03 AM), https://www.npr.org
/2020/08/25/904284865/make-farmers-black-again-african-americans-fight-discrimination-to-
own-farmland [https://perma.cc/RR7K-LUE6].
96. ACKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 9, 22–23.
97. Id. at 9. This survey included 12% of respondents who were farmers of color or In-
digenous farmers, compared to 5% of all current farm operators. Id. at 23. Notably, the survey
did not capture farmworkers. Id. This survey sample is not randomized nor modeled to repre-
sent all young farmers, only farmers connected to this membership organization, but it is evi-
dence that there are significant numbers of farmers and ranchers of color who do aspire to farm.
98. Id. at 8, 10. Land access is the number-one challenge limiting young farmers’ access
to farm or ranch careers—double the impact of the next most prevalent barrier, student-loan
debt. Id. at 34.
99. Id. at 14, 19.
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ning farmers are members of underrepresented groups (e.g., women, immi-
grants, veterans, racial/ethnic minorities, LGBTQ, and young farmers) who
face greater barriers to securing quality and affordable farmland.” 100
These new, upstart farmers also tend to be creative about the kinds of
farming they aspire to do, tending toward smaller scales and more diversi-
fied operations rejecting the more industrialized monocultures of modern
farming. 101 Climate change, of course, is another monumental transition on
our horizon. 102 These younger farmers also are more likely to focus on sus-
tainability and to actively seek to build climate resiliency. 103 Historically, the
actual relationship between farm size—or farm ownership structure—and
environmental outcomes has not always been direct, 104 but greater opera-
tional diversity and ground-up experimentation and innovation is critical to
creating more forward-looking resiliency and sustainability in complex sys-
tems generally. 105
The primary point, for now, is that the energy and the opportunity is
there. Despite all the challenges—agricultural concentration, rural depopula-
tion, environmental destruction—the U.S. countryside has a long history of
resistance, from agrarian populism to current farmworker alliances. 106 Nu-
merous grassroots organizations are working actively on food and land jus-
tice. 107 Soul Fire Farm in upstate New York, for example, has a “waiting list
100. CALO & PETERSEN-ROCKNEY, supra note 92, at 2.
101. ACKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 81.
102. The full scope of agriculture’s relationship to continued environmental degradation,
or its potential as a source of proactive mitigation, is beyond the scope of this Article, but the
sustainability of new enterprises and practices is a critical consideration. See, e.g., Carrie A.
Scrufari, Tackling the Tenure Problem: Promoting Land Access for New Farmers as Part of a
Climate Change Solution, 42 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 497 (2017); Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked
Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 1153, 1158–59 (2009).
103. See ACKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 59, 81.
104. E.g., Chen & Adams, supra note 12, at 408 (collecting evidence that, given financing
limits and capital constraints, “small farm size and family ownership represent absolutely no
guarantee of agroecological integrity”).
105. See, e.g., C.S. Holling & Lance H. Gunderson, Resilience and Adaptive Cycles, in
PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 25, 33–
40, 47–52 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002) (articulating theory of bottom-up
experimentation and adaptation in complex human and natural systems).
106. Holt-Giménez, supra note 87, at 8 (“Today the US has more people in prison than
farmers working the land.”).
107. E.g., Leah Penniman, After a Century in Decline, Black Farmers Are Back andOon
the Rise, YES! (May 5, 2016), https://www.yesmagazine.org/democracy/2016/05/05/after-a-
century-in-decline-black-farmers-are-back-and-on-the-rise [https://perma.cc/9VPY-46D7]
(collecting numerous examples); Want to See Food and Land Justice for Black Americans? Sup-
port These Groups., CIV. EATS (June 2, 2020), https://civileats.com/2020/06/02/want-to-see-
food-and-land-justice-for-black-americans-support-these-groups [https://perma.cc/VX9P-
4WBC]; see also infra Section IV.A.2 (collecting examples of ongoing grassroots reform efforts).
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many years long for their black- and brown-farmer training programs.” 108
There are over 12,000 Native students involved in farm training and agricul-
tural education programs like Future Farmers of America and supported by
organizations like the Indigenous Food and Agriculture Initiative. 109 And
throughout the country, there are numerous other stories of individuals and
groups creatively pushing the boundaries of what agriculture can be and
pursuing more inclusive rural futures. 110
II. PROPERTY’S PREJUDICES: HOW RURAL LANDSCAPES GOT SO WHITE
If American farmland ownership today is so racially stratified, how did it
get this way? This Part briefly recounts the most significant and explicit ways
the law designed this system of almost exclusively white agricultural land-
ownership. This Part emphasizes the racialized dimensions of original agri-
cultural land acquisition, including specific ways false race-based hierarchies
were deployed both to create a property system in the ideal of western, white
property ownership and to ensure the distribution of these valuable entitle-
ments to white landowners. This history of settlement and property develop-
ment still fundamentally shapes land ownership and how we think about it. 111
108. Adam Wernick, ‘Farming While Black’: Cultivating Food- and Racial-Justice in Up-
state New York, WORLD (Dec. 4, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-12-
04/farming-while-black-cultivating-food-and-racial-justice-upstate-new-york
[https://perma.cc/86XC-4GQJ].
109. See Kelsey Jones-Casey, Food Hero: Janie Simms Hipp, Founder of the Indigenous
Food and Agriculture Initiative, FOODTANK (Aug. 2013), https://foodtank.com/news/2013/08
/food-hero-janie-simms-hipp-co-founder-of-the-indigenous-food-and-agricultur
[https://perma.cc/6CHU-9D2W].
110. See Mai Nguyen, The One Thing My Farm Training Never Covered: Racism, NAT’L
YOUNG FARMERS COAL. (July 3, 2017), https://www.youngfarmers.org/2017/07/the-one-thing-
my-farm-training-never-covered-racism [https://perma.cc/6M8T-Z962]; Leah Penniman, A
New Generation of Black Farmers Is Returning to the Land, YES! (Nov. 19, 2019),
https://www.yesmagazine.org/social-justice/2019/11/19/land-black-farmers-reparations
[https://perma.cc/G49E-PZFD]; BOWENS, supra note 2, at 160–64.
111. Sonya Salamon, Cultural Dimensions of Land Tenure in the United States, in WHO
OWNS AMERICA? in SOCIAL CONFLICT OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS 159, 160 (Harvey M. Jacobs ed.,
1998). As a point of clarification, focusing on areas of concentrated rural poverty, the mostly
white Appalachian region also deserves attention. A large part of this regional poverty is also
attributable to disproportionate distributions of power, with fossil fuel industries often blamed
for inequitable extraction of wealth and resources while intense environmental and health
costs are borne by local communities. Although racially predominantly white, it is startling
how similar strategies for constructing racial difference—including, fundamentally, narratives
of essentializing a group’s “otherness”—have also been deployed against Appalachians to (at
least implicitly) justify and perpetuate these disparities. Nicholas F. Stump & Anne Marie Lo-
faso, De-essentializing Appalachia: Transformative Socio-legal Change Requires Unmasking Re-
gional Myths, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 823 (2018). Full analysis of this subject is beyond the scope of
this Article but is an important topic for continued conversation and exploration.
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A. Indigenous Land Acquisitions and Conversions
All real property titles in this country ultimately trace back to European
colonization of this country and, more particularly, the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Johnson v. M’Intosh. 112 In Johnson, the Court held that the Indig-
enous peoples of this continent did not hold full title to their lands—at least
as could be as recognized in U.S. courts—because of their Indigeneity. 113
Prior to European arrival, Indigenous peoples operated in multiple self-
sustaining and interlocking societies, each with their own independent land-
tenure systems and political territories. 114 Many of these Indigenous societies
operated rich and diverse agricultural systems, often deploying innovations
tied to the specific physical landscapes in which they operated. 115 U.S. set-
tlers, of course, learned from, traded with, and in numerous ways depended
on these preexisting Indigenous farming, fishing, and hunting operations. 116
But U.S. settlement also ultimately depended on the displacement of these
Indigenous systems and the dispossession of original Indigenous owners. By
legal magic act, and with no Indigenous representation or engagement in the
process, the Johnson decision transformed Indigenous peoples’ legal rela-
tionships to land and territory to one explicitly based on universalized as-
sumptions of European superiority and the ideal of “civilized,” Christian
explorers. Where Indian possessors had once been full owners of title to land
and sovereigns over territory, settlement of this continent by Christian Eu-
ropeans changed the nature of their claims to the entire continent—a form
of conquest by law as much as by force in many cases. 117
After Johnson, Indigenous nations and landowners still had a recognized
right of occupancy in the lands they continuously possessed—so-called Indi-
an or Aboriginal title—but they could only transfer their rights by federal
purchase or conquest. 118 The federal government then set to work using the
power of the federal purse to acquire original Indigenous lands and relocate
Indigenous peoples to the West—with policies including sequential treaty-
based reservation creations, forced removal, and even outright termination
of tribal recognition and status. These efforts involved some transactional
112. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 592 (1823).
113. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 593.
114. Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of
Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559, 1571–94 (2001).
115. E.g., Holt-Giménez, supra note 87, at 4; Readjustment of Indian Affairs: Hearing on
H.R. 7902 Before the H. Comm. on Indian Affs., 73rd Cong. 431 (1934) (statement of D.S. Otis)
(describing historic Indigenous agricultural economies based both on systems of individualis-
tic effort and reward and more cooperative, pooled resource and effort sharing).
116. Holt-Giménez, supra note 87, at 4.
117. STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE
FRONTIER (2005); LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF
AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS (2005).
118. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 592 (preserving Indian right of occupancy but imposing federal
restraint on alienation).
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exchanges, but the construction of a system in which Indigenous nations
could only transfer their rights to a single U.S. purchaser deflated economic
values.119 In addition, many transfers were forced and not at all consensual.120
Even after relocating Indigenous peoples to smaller, formal reservations
of land, with treaty promises that these spaces would be reserved for exclu-
sive and continuous Indigenous use, the federal government frequently re-
versed course and took more Native lands. In particular, the federal
allotment policy not only broke up tribes’ reserved landholdings in favor of
individual tribal citizen “allotments” but also forced sales of any euphemisti-
cally entitled “surplus lands” to non-Indian settlers within reservation
boundaries. 121 In all, between 1887 and 1934 when the allotment policy offi-
cially ended, Indigenous peoples lost another ninety million acres—or
60%—of their remaining land base, predominantly from forced surplus
sales. 122 Ironically, allotment was framed as an effort, in part, to promote
more productive Indigenous agriculture—using the individualistic incen-
tives of private ownership as a carrot to produce more productive agricultur-
al enterprise. But by permitting the leasing of allotments and otherwise
forcing an inefficient system of federally managed land tenure on Indian
people, allotment instead reduced the number of Indians farming and their
productivity. 123
Allotment also introduced a special federal trust status on reservation
lands that not only prohibits alienation without federal consent but also ce-
ments a significant federal management role over Indigenous land-use
choices. 124 Today, despite original claims to the entirety of the continent, In-
digenous tribes and citizens in the lower forty-eight states share only fifty-six
119. Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Expropriation
of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1114–15 (2000).
120. E.g., Jessica A. Shoemaker, An Introduction to American Indian Land Tenure: Map-
ping the Legal Landscape, 5 J.L. PROP. & SOC’Y 1, 19, 87–88 (2020) (describing, for example,
history of forced removals and government taking of lands, including the Black Hills).
121. General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389–90 (1887) (codified at
25 U.S.C. § 331 et seq.) (repealed 2007); see also Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 10–12 (1995); Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms
and the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 85 IOWA L. REV. 595, 605 & n.43 (2000); FELIX S.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 132–34, 138 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds.,
1982). In many instances, an initial protective trust status preventing alienation was also re-
moved prematurely from individual Indians’ allotments, resulting in almost every case in im-
mediate transfer to unscrupulous non-Indian speculators. See LEONARD A. CARLSON, INDIANS,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAND: THE DAWES ACT AND THE DECLINE OF INDIAN FARMING 13 (1981).
122. See FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 121, at 138;
CARLSON, supra note 121, at 18.
123. CARLSON, supra note 121, at 155, 159. “[A]llotment was followed by a dramatic de-
cline in Indian farming” in the first three decades of the twentieth century. Id. at 155.
124. See generally United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003) (discussing the
scope of secretarial discretion and trust responsibility in Indian Country).
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million acres of land in this now-permanent federal trust status. 125 Although
much of this land is agricultural, the trust status, with its continued federal
bureaucratic control, makes these Indian lands less efficient and flexible to
use. It is also blamed for continued poverty and lack of development in
many reservation communities—even as it does preserve remaining legal
landownership for the future. 126 Today, on many reservations, the majority
of agricultural lands are rented to non-Indian producers, if they are used at
all—locking many current Indigenous landowners out of their own lands for
use as farmers or for other purposes. 127
B. Denying Lands to Original Mexican Owners
California, Nevada, Utah, and portions of Colorado, New Mexico, Ari-
zona, and Wyoming were all created after a territorial land cession from the
Republic of Mexico memorialized in the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
which ended the Mexican-American War. 128 In this Treaty, the United States
solemnly promised that, as the new territorial sovereign, “it would ‘inviola-
bly respect’ the established private property rights of Mexican citizens in the
conquered territory.” 129 Specifically, the Treaty promised that Mexicans in
the ceded territory would be “maintained and protected in the free enjoy-
ment of their liberty and property.” 130
Families and communities who trace titles to original Mexican grants
protected under the Treaty, however, regularly found themselves frustrated
in their land claims. 131 Numerous factors conspired against Mexican land
claimants. 132 For example, U.S. courts required formal documentation to
125. Jessica A. Shoemaker, No Sticks in My Bundle: Rethinking the Indian Land Tenure
Problem, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 383 (2015).
126. Terry L. Anderson & Dean Lueck, Land Tenure and Agricultural Productivity on
Indian Reservations, 35 J.L. & ECON. 427 (1992).
127. See JESSICA A. SHOEMAKER, FARMERS’ LEGAL ACTION GRP., FARM AND RANCH
ISSUES IN INDIAN COUNTRY (2006), http://www.flaginc.org/publication/farm-and-ranch-
issues-in-indian-country [https://perma.cc/Y45L-QGRE]; Shoemaker, supra note 125.
128. U.S. GEN ACCT. OFF., GAO-04-59, TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO: FINDINGS
AND POSSIBLE OPTIONS REGARDING LONGSTANDING COMMUNITY LAND GRANT CLAIMS IN
NEW MEXICO 25–31 (2004).
129. Christine A. Klein, Treaties of Conquest: Property Rights, Indian Treaties, and the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 26 N.M. L. REV. 201, 202 (1996).
130. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico,
Mex.-U.S., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, 930. For one view of the difference between Indigenous
land claims after Johnson and the civil-law rights of former Mexican citizens under the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, see Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the Dis-
course of Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1629–31 (2000).
131. See, e.g., Guadalupe T. Luna, Chicana/Chicano Land Tenure in the Agrarian Do-
main: On the Edge of a “Naked Knife,” 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 39, 87–125 (1998); Tsosie, supra
note 130, at 1631–32.
132. The land-claims process was complex, but several analyses have emphasized its ra-
cial bias. E.g., Richard Griswold del Castillo, Manifest Destiny: The Mexican-American War
and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 5 SW. J.L. & TRADE AMS. 31, 37 (1998) (articulating how
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prove one’s claim under the Treaty, but many of these records had been de-
liberately destroyed by the U.S. military. 133 At the same time that Mexican
land claims were being denied for lack of documentation, white claimants
who lacked similar documentation were frequently granted exceptions. 134
Language and other barriers also created obstacles for Mexican claimants.
In general, “the legal system . . . had a great deal of sympathy for the
rights of settlers to vacant lands in the West, and had little sympathy for the
Mexican landowner as against white squatters who had cultivated and im-
proved the land for the statutory time under the doctrine of adverse posses-
sion.” 135 After the completion of the federal claims process, many individuals
and communities still claimed that their rights under Mexican law were dis-
regarded in the United States. 136 Moreover, those who were able to preserve
claims frequently lost their property after so-called range wars, in which
“[u]ltimately, the Anglo Texans won the battle, not with bullets but with
their control of the courts, the territorial legislature and the local peace offic-
ers.” 137 At the end of these conflicts, “thousands of former Mexican property
owners lost their lands to speculators, banks, and lawyers,” in Texas alone,
contributing to a “pattern of economic subordination” along racial and eth-
nic lines that persists in the Southwest today. 138
Later, while World War II sent much of the U.S. workforce to the mili-
tary, U.S. agriculture welcomed thousands of Mexicans to work in our
fields. 139 After the war, the U.S. government initiated the Bracero Program
by which another four million Mexican workers came to American fields;
today peasants and Indigenous peoples of Mexico, Central America, and the
Caribbean remain at the center of farm and food work and struggles for jus-
tice in the United States—but not in a landowner role. 140
racism of the time advantaged white landownership); Kim David Chanbonpin, How the Border
Crossed Us: Filling the Gap Between Plume v. Seward and the Dispossession of Mexican Land-
owners in California After 1848, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 297 (2005) (focusing on racialized dispos-
session in California specifically).
133. Tsosie, supra note 130, at 1629–30.
134. Id.; see also Luna, supra note 131, at 91, 94 (describing case of California senator
whose claim to gold mines was approved although he had “lost” the necessary granting papers,
in light of additional evidence of his admirable personal character); id. at 97–98 (describing
similar exception for Texas ranger and solider “who would not have committed fraud”).
135. Tsosie, supra note 130, at 1630.
136. E.g., id. at 1619 (describing case of one Hispanic community in Costilla County,
Colorado, which has been fighting for thirty years to confirm rights to 77,000 acres of moun-
tainous land that they claim to have used in common for nearly 150 years).
137. Griswold del Castillo, supra note 132, at 38.
138. Id.; see also Tsosie, supra note 130, at 1631.
139. Holt-Giménez, supra note 87, at 6.
140. Id.
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C. Slavery and Black Land Loss
Prior to the abolition of slavery in 1865, plantation owners in the Amer-
ican South enslaved millions of people taken from Africa for forced farm la-
bor. This racialized slave labor resulted in the accrual of enormous wealth for
the mostly white, male landowners. 141 The math of accounting for slavery’s
effects is difficult. On some conservative estimates, if former slaves were paid
for their agriculture labor outside of the institution of slavery, the debt would
be $6.4 trillion today. 142
Treating human beings as property not only increased the wealth and
power of slave-owning white “farmers” but also, of course, cemented and
stabilized a parallel race-based hierarchy in land ownership. Slaves very rare-
ly owned, or had the opportunity to own, their own farmland. 143 Upon the
abolition of slavery, part of the expectation for a federal repairing of these
historic harms included land-redistribution promises—the popularly imag-
ined “40 acres and a mule.” 144 In fact many of these efforts, including the
Southern Homestead Act, resulted in more distributions to white farmers
than freed slaves, as the Act allowed distribution to pardoned Southerners
and anyone else who claimed he had not supported the Confederacy. 145 Alt-
hough African Americans did acquire land after emancipation, it was “al-
most completely through private purchase, overcoming discriminatory
credit practices, violence perpetuated by anti-black groups, and the refusal of
many whites to sell to black people.” 146 And the lands they did purchase were
often suboptimal, “with less fertile soil, perhaps tucked away in the hills, not
too close to the main highways or railroads, nor to white schools or church-
es.” 147
Still, by 1890 African Americans represented 14% of all farmers and
owned roughly 15 million acres. 148 According to the U.S. Census of Agricul-
141. Horst & Marion, supra note 49, at 3; JOE R. FEAGIN & KIMBERLEY DUCEY, RACIST
AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, AND FUTURE REPARATIONS (4th ed. 2019).
142. E.g., Jeff Neumann & Tracy Matsue Loeffelholz, 40 Acres and a Mule Would Be at
Least $6.4 Trillion Today—What the U.S. Really Owes Black America, YES! (May 14, 2015),
https://www.yesmagazine.org/issue/make-right/2015/05/14/infographic-40-acres-and-a-mule-
would-be-at-least-64-trillion-today [https://perma.cc/3EJ5-KC8F].
143. See Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining
Black Landownership, Political Independence, and Community Through Partition Sales of Ten-
ancies in Common, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 523–24 (2001).
144. Id. at 525–26 (describing policy’s evolution and limited implementation).
145. But see RICHARD EDWARDS, JACOB K. FRIEFELD & REBECCA S. WINGO,
HOMESTEADING THE PLAINS: TOWARD A NEW HISTORY (2017) (emphasizing egalitarian ideals
of homesteading); Neil Canaday, Charles Reback & Kristin Stowe, Race and Local Knowledge:
New Evidence from the Southern Homestead Act, 42 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 399, 411 (2015)
(interrogating success rates for Black homesteaders).
146. Mitchell, supra note 143, at 526.
147. Id. (quoting PAMELA BROWNING, U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., THE DECLINE OF BLACK
FARMING IN AMERICA 22–23 (1982)).
148. Horst & Marion, supra note 49, at 3.
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ture, African American farmland ownership “peaked in 1910 at 16–19 mil-
lion acres.” 149 By 1997, however, this number was down to just 1.5 million
acres. 150 The causes of Black land loss are myriad but track a dramatic de-
cline in the number of Black farmers in the United States, far outpacing de-
clining farmer numbers among other groups. 151 One clear contribution is a
blatant—and well-documented—history of racial discrimination against
Black farmers by USDA officials and local loan-granting committees (com-
missioned at the county level to administer these federal farm programs), in-
cluding particularly in the granting and dissemination of essential farm
operating loans. 152 Exclusion of Black landowners from New Deal farm pro-
grams is another documented source. 153 Finally, land insecurity generated by
lack of probate access and generational intestacy and heir property also con-
tributes to continuing land loss. 154
D. Mostly White (and Mostly Male) Homesteading
Meanwhile, westward settlers sought to claim lands for themselves, often
for privatized farming. These settlers were primarily white and European
and sometimes sought to adversely possess or otherwise take even those
lands that had been reserved for other racial and ethnic groups. 155 Many
white land titles trace back more directly to official homesteading policies.
Between 1863 and 1939, some 1.5 million households received 246 million
acres of land via homesteading. 156 This widespread distribution of roughly
149. Gilbert et al., supra note 55, at 55.
150. Antonio Moore, Who Owns Almost All America’s Land?, INEQUALITY.ORG (Feb. 15,
2016), https://inequality.org/research/owns-land [https://perma.cc/XCS8-M8QZ]. By 1992, the
number of Black farmers in America had declined by 98%. Natasha Bowens, The Color of Food:
America’s Invisible Farmers, CIV. EATS (Apr. 14, 2015), https://civileats.com/2015/04/14/the-
color-of-food-an-introduction [https://perma.cc/62TM-2MKA]. In 2012, there were only
44,000 Black farmers in the United States, or 1.6% of farmers. Id.
151. Mitchell, supra note 143, at 527.
152. Id. at 528–29; see also Joshua Ulan Galperin, The Life of Administrative Democracy,
108 GEO. L.J. 1213, 1243–47 (2020) (outlining how locally elected, majoritarian county com-
mittee systems employed by the USDA resulted in widespread, race-based discrimination in
federal farm programs); see infra note 249 (discussing civil rights settlements with USDA).
153. AYAZI & ELSHEIKH, supra note 77, at 25 (detailing, for example, exclusion of Black
landowners from Agricultural Adjustment Administration support in the 1930s).
154. See Mitchell, supra note 143, at 517. Other sources of blame include the boll weevil
infestations in cotton, postwar mechanization, and “the lure of jobs and relative safety in the
North.” AYAZI & ELSHEIKH, supra note 77, at 54; see Jess Gilbert, Gwen Sharp & M. Sindy Fe-
lin, The Loss and Persistence of Black-Owned Farms and Farmland: A Review of the Research
Literature and Its Implications, 18 S. RURAL SOCIO., no. 2, 2002, at 1; see also infra Section
III.C.3.
155. E.g., Ann M. Eisenberg, Land Shark at the Door? Why and How States Should Regu-
late Landmen, 27 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 157, 179 (2016); see infra Section II.E.
156. Trina R. Williams Shanks, The Homestead Act of the Nineteenth Century and Its In-
fluence on Rural Lands 3 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Ctr. for Soc. Dev. Working Paper, Paper
No. 05-52, 2005), https://doi.org/10.7936/K77S7N9W [https://perma.cc/ZAJ8-8KH3].
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20% of the federal public domain at this time yielded significant economic
benefits for the country and for the homesteaders themselves. 157
The “vast majority” of homesteaders were white households, resulting in
redistribution of farmlands taken from Native Americans and Mexican own-
ers. 158 Title also predominantly went to men, although some women were
able to acquire title if they were “single, widowed, divorced, or deserted.” 159
Married women, however, were generally ineligible to take land in their own
name as the Act was limited to the “head of [a] household.” 160
Notably, the 1862 Homestead Act had no explicit racial restrictions, and
by 1866, it was clear that Black Americans were recognized as U.S. citizens,
making them eligible for their 160 acres of western public lands if they paid
the small fee and lived continuously on the property for five years. 161 The
Black Homesteaders in the Great Plains project at the University of Nebraska
has identified several African American homesteading communities that
once existed in the Great Plains with several hundred likely living in these
“colonies,” but the number of descendants still living in these places has
dramatically dwindled. 162 The largest of these communities—Nicodemus,
Kansas—once was home to three hundred to four hundred settlers, and it is
the only Black-homesteading community still occupied at all. 163 As of 2015,
there were seventeen descendants of these original Black homesteaders who
still owned farmland in the five-township vicinity near Nicodemus and five
were still actively farming. 164 This history is so unique that it is preserved as a
National Historic Site. 165
157. Id. at 3–7. In 1853, the United States owned 1.5 billion acres of public lands. BAILEY
ET AL., supra note 86, at 37.
158. Horst & Marion, supra note 49, at 3.
159. H. Elaine Lindgren, Women Homesteaders, ENCYC. GREAT PLAINS,
http://plainshumanities.unl.edu/encyclopedia/doc/egp.gen.040 [https://perma.cc/ZA5Y-TRTX].
160. Id.; see also Hannah Haksgaard, The Homesteading Rights of Deserted Wives: A His-
tory, 99 NEB. L. REV. 419 (2020). State laws at the time also curtailed women’s property rights
dramatically. See American Women: Resources from the Law Library, LIBR. CONG.,
https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/awhhtml/awlaw3/property_law.html [https://perma.cc/3PKU-
9RKF] (providing an overview of married women’s property laws in various states).
161. Richard Edwards, Opinion, The Disappearing Story of the Black Homesteaders Who
Pioneered the West, WASH. POST (July 5, 2018, 5:23 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/the-disappearing-story-of-the-black-homesteaders-who-pioneered-the-west/2018
/07/05/ca0b51b6-7f09-11e8-b0ef-fffcabeff946_story.html [https://perma.cc/N46U-BVFK].
162. EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 145.
163. See, Edwards, supra note 161.
164. Nicodemus: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L PARK SERV.,
https://www.nps.gov/nico/faqs.htm [https://perma.cc/Z6EP-8ENX].
165. Nicodemus: National Historic Site Kansas, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov
/nico/index.htm [https://perma.cc/EDL6-5T86].
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E. The Closing of the Grazing Commons and Conservation
While the Homestead Act and its contemporaries had the most impact
in the Midwest where soils were richer and the 160-acre maximum allotment
more sustainable, the Far West remained removed from more formalized
federal land policies for some time and also, given its unique physical terrain
and resource qualities, required some property adaptation. 166 Ranchers
drove cattle west in the 1870s and 1880s before the existence of any formal
government distribution system and divided grazing rights largely based on
local customs of first possession, with future entry and use of rangeland con-
strained through informal—but highly effective—local livestock associa-
tions. 167 Around this time, many firstcomer ranchers also marked their
claims with barbed wire fencing, even contrary to federal law. 168
By 1934, at the time of the Taylor Grazing Act, while ranchers continued
to assert informal claims to grazing lands, the federal government held ap-
proximately eighty million acres of western lands. 169 Today, the Bureau of
Land Management alone administers approximately 155 million acres of
federal rangeland. 170 Initial grazing allotments favored those who were al-
ready grazing and also favored owners of so-called base ranch lands adjacent
to the federally owned range on which the grazing would occur. 171 Through-
out the process of federal grazing management, existing claims have been
grandfathered and preserved, privileging historical acquisitions of white
ranchers over and over. 172 These ranching operations on public lands have
“remarkable staying power” and, even though permits are theoretically ter-
minable and not formally recognized as a property right, they are regularly
and reliably renewed—so routinely that “banks customarily capitalize the
permits’ value into the ranches to which they are adjacent.” 173
This parallels numerous instances in federal conservation and public
lands policy in which federal laws actively “eliminated indigenous presence
in order to preserve landscapes for non-Indians.” 174 Conservation efforts,
alongside the goals of extraction and settlement, also drove Indigenous peo-
ples out of landscapes, including through the designation of forest reserves,
166. Gary D. Libecap, The Assignment of Property Rights on the Western Frontier: Lessons
for Contemporary Environmental and Resource Policy, 67 J. ECON. HIST. 257, 265 (2007).
167. Id. at 271–72.
168. Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the Amer-
ican West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 172 (1975).
169. Libecap, supra note 166, at 274; Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 315–315r).
170. See HARDY VINCENT, supra note 48.
171. Bruce R. Huber, The Durability of Private Claims to Public Property, 102 GEO. L.J.
991, 1029 (2014).
172. See id. at 1002.
173. Id. at 1004–05.
174. Sarah Krakoff, Public Lands, Conservation, and the Possibility of Justice, 53 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 213, 215 (2018).
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national parks, and national monuments on tribal lands. 175 This system still
dramatically limits opportunities for new entrants to public land grazing—
despite the ideal that these spaces be public and subject to adaptive man-
agement and other reflective land-use choices and designs for public purpos-
es. 176 Instead of providing open and equitable access, “public regulation of
land access erected barriers to entry that secured existing claimants’ hold on
their preferred resources,” even while “spar[ing] these claimants the need for
capital outlays for the purchase of property.” 177 This is particularly true for
the grazing rights allocation process under the Taylor Grazing Act, which
“made it exceedingly unlikely that newcomers to ranching would succeed in
obtaining access to public lands previously claimed by existing ranchers.” 178
F. Alien Property Acts
Finally, specific legislation directly barred many Asian American immi-
grants from owning land well into the twentieth century. 179 Moreover, dur-
ing World War II, many Japanese Americans incarcerated in internment
camps lost their farms and homes. 180
III. DECONSTRUCTING THE FEE SIMPLE
With these and other acts, America constructed a legal system that allo-
cated land to its white citizens, to the exclusion of people of color. These
choices radically transformed the American landscape and dispersed nearly
exclusive white agricultural landownership. This history of racism, however,
might be confined to the past if everyone had equal opportunity to acquire
land today—if labor and hard work were rewarded fairly and parallel oppor-
tunities for land access distributed equally. In that just world, current dispar-
175. Id.
176. Huber, supra note 171, at 1037.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1037 n.251 (citing WESLEY CALEF, PRIVATE GRAZING AND PUBLIC LANDS:
STUDIES OF THE LOCAL MANAGEMENT OF THE TAYLOR GRAZING ACT 62–66 (1960)). In addi-
tion to the allocation of durable rights to claim continued privileges and the preferencing of
existing permittees, the Taylor Grazing Act also “created Grazing Advisory Boards, comprised
of ranchers themselves, which were responsible for managing the local range allocation pro-
cess.” Huber, supra note 171, at 1038 n.255. All this has also taken on racial overtones, with
numerous commentators noting narratives of white domination in federal grazing, including
standoffs and protests opposing ongoing federal oversight. E.g., Anne Bonds & Joshua Inwood,
Beyond White Privilege: Geographies of White Supremacy and Settler Colonialism, 40 PROGRESS
HUM. GEOGRAPHY 715 (2016); Kimmel & Ferber, supra note 85, at 586; Ann M. Eisenberg,
Alienation and Reconciliation in Social-Ecological Systems, 47 ENV’T L. 127 (2017).
179. E.g., Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943); Webb-
Haney Act (Alien Land Law) of 1913, 1913 Cal. Stat. 260, invalidated by Sei Fujii v. State, 242
P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952). In general, these laws barred land ownership without legal citizenship
and were consistently upheld.
180. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, No Right to Own? The Early Twentieth-Century “Alien Land
Laws” as a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37 (1998).
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ities in wealth and land ownership would reflect the logical consequence of
unequal effort and skill, rather than the compounding effects of historic ex-
clusion. But, instead, we live in a world built to perpetuate original exclu-
sions and racialized wealth distributions.
Part of this reflects the general truth that owning and then transferring
property within a family is an efficient means of generational wealth accu-
mulation. Nonwhite citizens locked out of original property ownership start-
ed at a disadvantage, and this disadvantage continued over generations and
now still impacts who can—and cannot—competitively access land mar-
kets. 181 But this is not the full story. This Part argues that our most funda-
mental property-law choices—including the design of the fee simple itself—
also actively privilege the original acquirers of land and facilitate wealth con-
centration in ways that disproportionately impact people of color. First-
generation property rights did not end at the first generation but rather, by
design, continued perpetually. We also decided that landholding does not
require active use and caretaking but can be commodified into an abstract
(and ultimately concentrated) investment vehicle. Meanwhile, farm policy
inflates the value of agricultural land and encourages land retention over
transfer, limiting even further the opportunities for new entrants. This Part
explores these and other mechanisms in more depth, but the result is clear.
We have created an agricultural land-tenure system that shut the door on
people of color and keeps that door shut. The surprise is not that this racial-
ized exclusion continues but that these same property choices are now back-
firing against even their original white beneficiaries, facilitating both the
industrialization of American agriculture and the depopulation and decline
of so many rural communities.
A. Forever Rights
Perpetual duration is a core feature of fee simple ownership. The fee
simple estate is endless. Fee title bestows rights to control and exclude others
from agricultural land into eternity.
Although the fee’s perpetual nature now seems inevitable and essential
to American property, this is a choice that deviates from other land-tenure
organizations. Numerous Indigenous governance structures recognized in-
dividual, exclusive use and possession rights but only so long as the posses-
sor was actually actively using and maintaining the land. 182 Abandonment,
nonuse, or violation of community-imposed limitations could all result in
forfeiture of the land to the community, permitting redistribution consistent
181. See Rosser, supra note 32, at 133–40 (collecting examples of generational effects of
historically racist property distributions); cf. Thomas M. Shapiro, Race, Homeownership and
Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 53, 59 (2006) (arguing that federal policies facilitating mid-
dle-class homeownership and wealth accumulation “have traditionally reinforced residential
segregation”).
182. E.g., Bobroff, supra note 114, at 1584; Stacy L. Leeds, The Burning of Blackacre: A
Step Toward Reclaiming Tribal Property Law, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 496 (2000).
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with group needs. 183 Some modern water rights and civil law usufructs also
contain similar conditions requiring active use and care. 184 Even Thomas Jef-
ferson saw the earth as fundamentally a “usufruct to the living” and believed,
at least on some level, that the “portion occupied by any individual ceases to
be his when himself ceases to be, and reverts to the society.” 185 The initial
homesteading program in America also required active, direct possession
and improvement—although only for a short initial prove-up period and,
once the initial conditions were met, the actually issued fee patent was again
a perpetual grant. 186
The fundamental endlessness of American property design has im-
portant benefits, including allowing an owner to securely choose to hold on-
to or conserve resources until a later date without fear that another user will
swoop in and take that resource first. 187 In this way, perpetual, secure owner-
ship is designed very specifically (and beneficially) to avoid the overcon-
sumption tragedies of some common resources and to encourage secure in-
investment in and stewardship of land for the long term. 188 It also facilitates
the kind of identity-reinforcing community and family ties to specific places,
including over generations, that build valuable social attachments. Durable
connections to place do matter. 189
But an initial allocation of perpetual rights also has enormous, lasting
distributional effects. The original westward expansion of white landowner-
ship did not leave a reserve of open spaces on which future generations could
spread more equitably. Now, new farmers not lucky enough to inherit farm-
land have to acquire that land from someone else; by design, the current
owners get to trade not only the value of that land in some time-limited par-
cel—as they would if their rights were measured by one’s life or one’s active
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 7, at 1364 (“[A] classic usufruct can be defined as an
immutable package of land-use rights that are not transferrable and that terminate when the
usufruct’s owner dies or ceases the use.”); Scott A. Clark & Alix L. Joseph, Commentary,
Changes of Water Rights and the Anti-speculation Doctrine: The Continuing Importance of Ac-
tual Beneficial Use, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 553, 555 (2006) (discussing water law require-
ment of demonstrated ability to use water at specified place as prerequisite to obtaining right).
185. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 27 MARCH 1789 TO 30 NOVEMBER 1789, at 392, 392 (Julian P. Boyd &
William H. Gaines, Jr. eds., 1958) (emphasis omitted).
186. See Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, § 2, 12 Stat. 392, 392 (repealed 1976); cf. di Ro-
bilant, supra note 6, at 954 (discussing an alternative, failed proposal that would have imposed a
continuing “duty to reside on and cultivate the land”).
187. See Fennell, supra note 35, at 1480 (discussing fee simple’s fundamental endlessness).
188. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,
355 (1967) (describing how private property owner is uniquely suited to balance “competing
claims of the present and the future”).
189. See, e.g., Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property’s Memories, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1071,
1078–79 (2011) (exploring property’s role in storing collective and individual memories).
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use, for example—but also the value of the land for perpetuity. 190 All of this
maximizes wealth, as well as political and social power and privilege, in the
first generation of owners. As detailed further below, these original distribu-
tions are sticky. Even if original landowners’ descendants no longer hold the
land itself, the value of those forever rights was realized to their ancestors. It
will take a jolting event (or major legal change) for the initially dispossessed
to catch up.
B. Abstract Estates
The second land-tenure feature that negatively impacts equity on rural
landscapes is the construction of the fee simple as a divisible set of legal
rights that can be commodified and separated from the physical land it-
self. 191 By separating legal investment rights from labor and possession, we
facilitate the exchange and consolidation of abstract profit privileges, con-
centrating both wealth and agricultural control in those who may have no
actual knowledge of or connection with the land and its surroundings. This
conception of property as a divisible and disembodied bundle of legal rights
perpetuates our racialized agricultural system in at least three ways. First, it
facilitates persistent claims of absentee heirs of original owners, even when
they do not remain to farm. Second, it allows the concentration of land own-
ership beyond what a single farmer could actively possess and manage. This
concentration further limits new entrants’ market access. Finally, by sanc-
tioning the depopulation that coincides with this concentrated and absentee
ownership, we further obscure the on-the-ground, material, and deleterious
effects of modern (and often industrial) agriculture into a distant, shadowed
place—where, for example, the disproportionate tax on the natural world
and mostly Black and brown farmworkers is conveniently out of sight.
1. The Privilege of Absent Heirs
By allowing the separation of rights to capital and income from the obli-
gations of actual caretaking and labor, the fee simple fails to impose any
190. Other property scholars have critiqued property’s original role in distributing the
most basic elements required for life in an inequitable fashion. E.g., LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER,
THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 120 (2003) (articulating the most funda-
mental truth that by granting some people’s claims to universal human needs, property law
necessarily denies the claims of others); Laura S. Underkuffler, Essay, The Politics of Property
and Need, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 363, 369 (2010) (arguing need should be part of prop-
erty’s social calculation); Singer, supra note 15, at 778 (connecting property access to social
demands for equality and human dignity).
191. E.g., Charles F. Wilkinson, Law and the American West: The Search for an Ethic of
Place, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 401, 401–02, 505–06 (1988) (reflecting on shift from natural bound-
aries of ecosystems and landscapes into artificial legal boxes of property ownership and “the
evolution of land from matter to property” (quoting PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE LEGACY
OF CONQUEST: THE UNBROKEN PAST OF THE AMERICAN WEST 27 (1987))).
June 2021] Fee Simple Failures 1725
meaningful limit on an owner’s absenteeism. 192 Instead, property law has al-
lowed an increasing separation of ownership as investment from ownership
as possession and material caretaking.
As a practical matter, this divisibility allows land to remain in current
white families, even when heirs and other next-generation landowners are
far removed from farming. Overall, the turnover rates for farmers—
including older farmers exiting and new farmers entering—are low. As of
2014, the vast majority of private farmland (69%) is owned by people over
65, and about a third of principal farm operators are over 65. 193 This sug-
gests that, at some point in the relatively near future, a significant amount of
farmland will have to transfer (at least upon the death of the current own-
er). 194 Yet the USDA has predicted that these acres are three times as likely
to be sold to a relative, put in a trust, or transferred via a will or gift as they
are to be sold on an open market. 195 This likely reflects historic practice as
well, because most acres that are purchased in arm’s length transactions are
“recycled”—or were themselves originally purchased from a nonrelative—
“suggesting that the supply of land available for purchase on the open mar-
ket may not vary much over time.” 196
Understandably, many existing farmers desire to keep land in their
families, and the law facilitates this by allowing distant children who no
longer live on or near the property to maintain ownership and remaining ab-
sentee owners of farmlands, often renting their inheritances to tenant farm-
ers. 197 Today, roughly 40% of farmland is rented out, 198 and the majority of
these agricultural landlords (54%) inherited or received the land they rent as
a gift. 199 This has significant wealth-distribution consequences. Nearly all ag-
ricultural landlords (disproportionately the beneficiaries of gifts and inher-
192. But see Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163,
1173 (1999) (discussing how, on the opposite end of the spectrum, property system features
like property taxes and registration fees do deter excessive fragmentation of ownership).
193. BIGELOW ET AL., U.S. FARMLAND OWNERSHIP, supra note 48, at 33, 36.
194. ACKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 7.
195. In the five-year period following 2014, the USDA predicted only 2.3% of farmlands
(or about twenty-one million acres) would be sold on the open, competitive market. BIGELOW
ET AL., U.S. FARMLAND OWNERSHIP, supra note 48, at 33. In the same timeframe, 7.8% of farm-
lands (or more than seventy-one million acres) were expected to be sold to a relative, put in a
trust, or transferred via a will or gift. See id. at 34 tbl.5; Daniel Bigelow & Todd Hubbs, Land
Acquisition and Transfer in U.S. Agriculture, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.: AMBER WAVES (Aug. 25, 2016)
https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2016/august/land-acquisition-and-transfer-in-us-
agriculture [https://perma.cc/WEM6-BMFF].
196. Bigelow & Hubbs, supra note 195.
197. See Ed Maixner & Sara Wyant, Big Changes Ahead in Land Ownership and Farm
Operators?, AGRIPULSE (Feb. 5, 2019, 12:41 PM), https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/11869-
big-changes-ahead-in-land-ownership-and-farm-operators [https://perma.cc/L2V8-73EQ].
198. CALO & PETERSEN-ROCKNEY, supra note 92, at 2.
199. BIGELOW ET AL., U.S. FARMLAND OWNERSHIP, supra note 48, at 32. Another 11% of
these agricultural landlords purchased the land from a relative. Id. Only 30% purchased from a
nonrelative, with another 2% indicating they purchased land at an auction. Id.
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itances) report that they own their lands free and clear of any debt or other
obligations. 200 And of course the tenants renting these farmlands are dispro-
portionately members of minority groups. 201
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with making some farmland availa-
ble for rent, especially insofar as it provides lower-stake opportunities for
new entrants to begin farming. But these tenancies are often insecure and
financially unstable. 202 The land has a limited potential for producing in-
come; splitting the returns on that resource—requiring both the producer-
farmer and the landowner-landlord to receive financial return on it—
necessarily diminishes revenues for farmers, pinching what are often already
tenuous start-up operations. 203 Absentee landownership also negatively af-
fects rural communities’ cohesion. Sociologists regularly emphasize the close
connection between locally owned and operated farms and rural community
welfare. 204 Active, local farm ownership and operation corresponds to great-
er community engagement and a healthier local economy, while communi-
ties with larger-scale corporate farms demonstrate a loss of local dollars and
greater economic and social stratification. 205
2. Concentration and Financialization
This system of abstract property rights also allows the consolidation of
land beyond what one person or family could ever directly farm, use, or rea-
sonably maintain. That neither property nor any other legal rule has im-
posed meaningful limits on this concentration means that smaller-scale
farms—including farms owned and operated by white farmers—face signifi-
cant pressure in their efforts to maintain their farm livelihood and lifestyles.206
200. Fully 94% of nonoperator landlords’ rented lands are completely paid for, and 89%
of lands rented by operator landlords are owned free and clear. NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., su-
pra note 54, at 2.
201. See infra Section III.C.3.c (discussing disproportionate minority leasing rate).
202. See infra Section III.C.3.c.
203. Neil D. Hamilton, Essay, The Role of Land Tenure in the Future of American Agricul-
ture, 22 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 349, 356 (2017).
204. See, e.g., Conner Bailey, Abhimanyu Gopaul, Ryan Thomson & Andrew Gunnoe,
Taking Goldschmidt to the Woods: Timberland Ownership and Quality of Life in Alabama, 86
RURAL SOCIO. 50 (2021) (extending prior body of sociological work tying absentee and corpo-
rate ownership of agricultural operations to poor community welfare outcomes to timberland
ownership in South).
205. See, e.g., Linda Lobao & Curtis W. Stofferahn, The Community Effects of Industrial-
ized Farming: Social Science Research and Challenges to Corporate Farming Laws, 25 AGRIC. &
HUM. VALUES 219, 225–26 (2008); Stephanie A. Malin & Kathryn Teigen DeMaster, A Devil’s
Bargain: Rural Environmental Injustices and Hydraulic Fracturing on Pennsylvania’s Farms, 47
J. RURAL STUD. 278, 278; see also Thomas A. Lyson & Charles C. Geisler, Toward a Second Ag-
ricultural Divide: The Restructuring of American Agriculture, 32 SOCIOLOGIA RURALIS 248
(1992) (analyzing trends in agricultural organization).
206. Increasingly, members of this very group—struggling white farmers—are recogniz-
ing this unique convergence: being both a victim of modern farm policy and the beneficiary of
generations of white privilege, particularly through original land-based distributions. See, e.g.,
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The story of horizontal agricultural concentration—or the consolidation
of ownership and control within one sector of the agriculture system—is well
rehearsed. Between 1982 and 2007, for example, the midpoint acreage dou-
bled from 589 acres to 1,105 acres. 207 These farms have also become more
specialized. 208 Between 1935 and 2012, the number of farms shrank from 6
million to 2 million, and while the majority of Americans at one time farmed
self-sufficiently, today less than 2% of Americans farm at all. 209 Within the
farms that remain, there is also a concentration of production by a few large-
scale producers. As of 2014, 49.7% of agricultural production value was at-
tributed to “large-scale family-owned and non-family-owned operations”
that make up only 4.7% of U.S. farms.210 In other parts of the food chain, as of
2007, four corporations owned 85% of soybean processing, 82% of beef pack-
ing, 63% of pork packing and manufacture, and 50% of the milk industry. 211
A related trend is vertical integration of food production, particularly in
swine and poultry production. Vertical integration, as the name implies, de-
scribes the consolidation of ownership and control at multiple links in the
food supply chain, such as the integrated control of both livestock produc-
tion and meat processing by companies like Tyson and Smithfield Foods.
Much of the initial investment and the production risks are born by the pro-
ducers, with profits flowing to corporate shareholders who are physically
removed from the direct impacts (environmental, economic, and social) of
this intensive production.
There have been numerous attempts to enforce antitrust-like protec-
tions, including those contained in the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921,
without much success. 212 This is a legal debate both about the degree to
SARAH SMARSH, HEARTLAND: A MEMOIR OF WORKING HARD AND BEING BROKE IN THE
RICHEST COUNTRY ON EARTH 102 (2018) (“We thus benefited from our skin color in ways that
are hard to perceive by three white people working a field together, no other human being,
town, or structure in sight to the horizon—a complicated mix of privilege and disadvantage.”);
Neil Hamilton, Iowa’s White Privilege Has a Billion Dollar Price Tag, BILLMOYERS.COM (Aug.
17, 2020), https://billmoyers.com/story/iowas-white-privilege-has-a-billion-dollar-price-tag
[https://perma.cc/A4VG-5HE3] (“My so-called white privilege was growing up in an ill-heated
farm house without running water watching my parents eke out our living on a small
farm. . . . If we are honest with ourselves white privilege is all around us—in fact it is almost
foundational to our state.”).
207. AYAZI & ELSHEIKH, supra note 77, at 51.
208. See id. (describing change from diversified farms of 1900 to the more typical mono-
crop operations of 2010).
209. Scrufari, supra note 102, at 502.
210. AYAZI & ELSHEIKH, supra note 77, at 21.
211. Id. at 21.
212. See, e.g., William E. Rosales, Comment, Dethroning Economic Kings: The Packers
and Stockyards Act of 1921 and Its Modern Awakening, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1497, 1522–24 (dis-
cussing challenges to captive supply issues in livestock markets).
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which the law permits (or does not) this kind of monopolistic consolidation
and the ability of courts and litigants to enforce those boundaries, if they exist.213
Although these figures relate more to the ownership of farm wealth and
farm businesses, the same trends are happening with land. For example, all
rural landownership has grown more concentrated in recent years, not just
agricultural land. Since 2008, the hundred largest private landowners have
increased their collective holdings from fewer than thirty million acres to
forty million acres (an area just about the size of Florida).214 According to one
report, “[t]he five largest landowners in America, all white, own more rural
land than all of black America combined.” 215 Ted Turner owns two million
acres alone—a landmass three times greater than the state of Rhode Is-
land 216—and he’s not even the largest private landowner in the United
States. That distinction belongs to John Malone, who owns 2.2 million
acres. 217
For farmland more specifically, a parallel trend is occurring with the fi-
nancialization of ownership. Farm properties in the United States and glob-
ally are increasingly being purchased directly by investors and various
farmland investment vehicles, such as private equity funds and real estate
investment trusts (REITs). 218 Exact numbers of investor-owned acres are dif-
213. See Peter C. Carstensen, The Packers and Stockyards Act: A History of Failure to
Date, CPI ANTITRUST J., Apr. 2010, at 1, 4–5, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com
/the-packers-and-stockyards-act-a-history-of-failure-to-date [https://perma.cc/KZ67-X5DV];
Michael Sykuta, Concentration, Contracting and Competition: Problems in Using the Packers
and Stockyards Act to Supplement Antitrust, CPI ANTITRUST J., Apr. 2010, at 1, 2, https://www
.competitionpolicyinternational.com/concentration-contracting-and-competition-problems-
in-using-the-packers-stockyards-act-to-supplement-antitrust [https://perma.cc/B254-BF4H];
Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, A First Principles Approach to Antitrust Enforcement
in the Agricultural Industry, CPI ANTITRUST J., Apr. 2010, at 1, https://www.competition
policyinternational.com/a-first-principles-approach-to-antitrust-enforcement-in-the-
agricultural-industry [https://perma.cc/DA65-ZYEL].
214. Dave Merrill, Devon Pendleton, Sophie Alexander, Jeremy C.F. Lin & Andre Tartar,
Here’s Who Owns the Most Land in America, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www
.bloomberg.com/graphics/2019-largest-landowners-in-us [https://perma.cc/5EFF-7E82]; Chris-
topher Ingraham, American Land Barons: 100 Wealthy Families Now Own Nearly as Much Land
as That of New England, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/12/21/american-land-barons-100-wealthy-families-now-own-nearly-
as-much-land-as-that-of-new-england [https://perma.cc/LQ8N-3W54].
215. Moore, supra note 150.
216. Id.
217. Land Report 100, LAND REP., https://landreport.com/americas-100-largest-
landowners [https://perma.cc/5W3J-7M2K].
218. Madeleine Fairbairn, ‘Like Gold with Yield’: Evolving Intersections Between Farm-
land and Finance, 41 J. PEASANT STUD. 777, 778–79, 787–88 (2014) (detailing U.S. trends of
increasing external investments in farmland and a move to the “financialization”—or the “ten-
dency for profit making in the economy to occur increasingly through financial channels ra-
ther than through productive activities”—of agriculture (quoting GRETA R. KRIPPNER,
CAPITALIZING ON CRISIS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE RISE OF FINANCE 4 (2011)); see also
Saturnino M. Borras Jr., Ruth Hall, Ian Scoones, Ben White & Wendy Wolford, Towards a Bet-
ter Understanding of Global Land Grabbing: An Editorial Introduction, 38 J. PEASANT STUD.
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ficult to find. 219 But, the trend is clear and is radically transforming agricul-
ture again. 220 Foreign interest in agricultural landownership has also in-
creased. In 2019, foreign investors owned 35.2 million acres of U.S. agri-
agricultural land—a figure that doubled in just two decades. 221 This is true
even though several states have sought to prohibit foreign (non–U.S.-citizen)
ownership of agricultural land. 222
In all of these contexts, the resulting consolidation in markets is com-
plex, with cascading effects, but two facts are clear: (1) property law imposes
no limits on this extreme land and market consolidation, and (2) when more
land is grabbed and held by fewer and more powerful investors, there is less
for small-scale producers to access and use.
3. Agriculture in the Shadows
Finally, the disconnect between land as a legal commodity and land as a
physical place has important downstream consequences. As agricultural
landownership becomes increasingly concentrated and absentee, rural land-
scapes empty out. There are simply fewer people (especially people with rela-
tive privilege and social, political, and economic power) to bear witness to
the world in which our food is produced. This has numerous consequences,
including a series of racialized repercussions.
As land is increasingly reduced to an abstract investment and wealth ve-
hicle, it becomes divorced from local relationships and place-based
knowledge. Australian scholar Nicole Graham has emphasized the phenom-
enon of “dephysicalisation of property” and powerfully tied this transition to
209 (2011) (situating farmland financialization in context of larger global land grab); Marcello
De Maria, Understanding Land in the Context of Large-Scale Land Acquisitions: A Brief History
of Land in Economics, 8 LAND, no. 1, 2019, at 1, https://doi.org/10.3390/land8010015
[https://perma.cc/LL22-CRV4] (tracing historical evolution of land in economics toward
commodification, as an asset right for large-scale investment and acquisitions).
219. See, e.g., Megan Horst, Changes in Farmland Ownership in Oregon, USA, 8 LAND,
no. 3, 2019, at 1, https://doi.org/10.3390/land8030039 [https://perma.cc/P2R8-6PU3] (describ-
ing study methodology that required obtaining and assessing individual land transfer records
from numerous county accessor offices).
220. See generally MADELEINE FAIRBAIRN, FIELDS OF GOLD: FINANCING THE GLOBAL
LAND RUSH (2020). More popular discussions of these coming changes are emerging across the
political spectrum. E.g., LUKAS ROSS, OAKLAND INST., DOWN ON THE FARM: WALL STREET;
AMERICA’S NEW FARMER (2014), https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org
/files/OI_Report_Down_on_the_Farm.pdf [https://perma.cc/77D3-QSS8]; Maixner & Wyant,
supra note 197.
221. TRICIA BARNES, MARY ESTEP, VERONICA GRAY, CATHERINE FEATHER & PHIL
SRONCE, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREIGN HOLDINGS OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL LAND THROUGH
DECEMBER 31, 2019, at 1, https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles/EPAS
/PDF/afida2019report.pdf [https://perma.cc/EX8S-L2NF]; see also Renee Wilde, ‘American Soil’
Is Increasingly Foreign Owned, NPR (May 27, 2019, 4:17 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/27
/723501793/american-soil-is-increasingly-foreign-owned [https://perma.cc/F92X-PVK4].
222. Wilde, supra note 221.
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anthropogenic environmental change. 223 By disconnecting property rights
from the material constraints of physical places, we create “diasporas and de-
forested, mined and drained landscapes of dephysicalised property” that she,
building on prior work, terms “shadow places.” 224 Shadow places—like many
of America’s agricultural landscapes and abandoned rural places—become
dumping grounds for society’s externalities, out of sight and out of mind
from majoritarian and mostly urban experience. 225 American scholar Ann
Eisenberg, meanwhile, identifies rural America as a zone of “sacrifice.” 226
America has very little idea of where its food comes from. Because the
industrialized realities of many agricultural operations are not well under-
stood—operating, instead, in the shadows as they do—the romantic ideal of
a traditional (red barn, green tractor, white skin) farm still has enormous
power in our collective cultural and political imagination. 227 Farms, many
imagine, are still small, independent, agrarian stewards. 228 So, for example,
rhetoric about “saving the family farm” is still so powerful. Yet, as explained
above, many of these farms are much more industrialized and concentrated
than this image suggests, and even family ownership does not, by itself, re-
duce absenteeism or ensure any particular ecological commitments.
Moreover, to the extent this language is about preserving existing family
farms, this is coding a specific protection for existing land allocations to
mostly white owners. Generational farms represent a significant source of
inherited wealth. And not just any inherited wealth but wealth inherited
through a very specific history of racism and, in some cases, on the backs of
mostly nonwhite farmworkers. 229 On one level, efforts to “save the family
223. Nicole Graham, Dephysicalised Property and Shadow Lands, in HANDBOOK ON
SPACE, PLACE AND LAW 281, 281–82 (Robyn Bartel & Jennifer Carter eds., 2021); see also
NICOLE GRAHAM, LAWSCAPE: PROPERTY, ENVIRONMENT, LAW (2011); cf. Kenneth J.
Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern
Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 329, 333–40 (1980) (discussing the history of
dephysicalization of property in U.S. context).
224. Graham, Dephysicalised Property, supra note 223, at 281 (quoting Val Plumwood,
Shadow Places and the Politics of Dwelling, AUSTRALIAN HUMS. REV., 2008, at 139, 139). Gra-
ham and others have also emphasized that these property choices are neither natural nor uni-
versal. See id. at 288 (“No property regime lasts forever.”); GRAHAM, LAWSCAPE, supra note
223, at 204–06; Margaret Davies, Can Property Be Justified in an Entangled World?, 17
GLOBALIZATIONS 1104, 1111 (2020) (“Despite the pretence at universality, it is therefore im-
possible and even deceptive to think about property abstractly, as though there is some right-
ness underlying it in the fabric of human co-existence and relationship with the physical world.”).
225. Loka Ashwood & Kate MacTavish, Tyranny of the Majority and Rural Environmen-
tal Injustice, 47 J. RURAL STUD. 271 (2016).
226. Eisenberg, supra note 89.
227. See Chen & Adams, supra note 12, at 371.
228. See Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Farmers Union et al. in Support of Appellants and in
Support of Reversal of the Judgment Below at 3, Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 2006)
(No. 06-1308).
229. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, The Echoes of Slavery: Recognizing the Racist Origins of the
Agricultural and Domestic Worker Exclusion from the National Labor Relations Act, 72 OHIO
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farm” have not only failed to address concentration and scale issues but also,
perhaps, diverted attention from the access needs of new entrants, especially
people of color. Why should we promote inheritance of agricultural opera-
tions in particular? What do we do with emerging racialized rural ghettos
while other white, rural residents complain unironically about declining
populations in their own communities? If the concern is maintaining local
control of local lands, or even just a local population base in many rural
communities, why not allow new farmers in? Because of the shadowed na-
ture of many of these landscapes, these are the hard questions we have large-
ly avoided asking—to our detriment.
C. Allocating Land Retention and Land Loss
Finally, numerous other legal choices impact the value of farmland and
directly influence owners’ decisions about when to hold and when to sell.
Certainly, many existing landowners desire to keep specific legacy properties
in their families for reasons not shaped by any particular legal or economic
incentive, and there is social value in supporting some of these positive
place-based attachments. 230 The laws influencing land markets, however, do
not attempt to distinguish the kinds of land retention that are desirable over
time (because they reinforce positive geographic connections and family leg-
acies, for example) and those that produce negative externalities across rural
landscapes (like disproportionate exclusion of new farmers and ranchers,
monopolistic land control by anonymous investors, and increasing wealth
concentration). Instead, the relevant variable seems to be that more wealthy
(and therefore often white) landowners are supported in keeping their
lands—in whatever ownership form and for whatever use—while more vul-
nerable landowners (and therefore disproportionately people of color) are
more likely to lose their land through legal process.
This Section analyzes both ends of this spectrum: how policy drives land
retention for some and racializes land insecurity for others. It covers policies
that support land retention, including choices that inflate land values and poli-
cies that encourage existing owners to retain valuable land as long as possible.
Finally, this Section concludes with examples of how land insecurity, by con-
trast, remains racialized to the detriment of farmers and ranchers of color.
1. Inflating Land Values
The law reinforces existing owners’ retention by actively subsidizing
land values. Numerous farm policies, from subsidized crop insurance to fed-
eral biofuel incentives, distort farmland values. 231 Indeed, farmland values
ST. L.J. 95, 118 (2011); Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial
Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335 (1987).
230. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
231. This raises the question of whether these land values can be maintained or are a
bubble preparing to pop, especially with falling or at least volatile prices for many farm products.
1732 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 119:1695
have increased exponentially in recent decades. In Iowa, for example, a typi-
cal $419 acre in 1970 skyrocketed to $7,183 in 2016—a 1,600% increase. 232
By 2019, Iowa farmland averaged $7,432 per acre. 233 On average, an acre of
farmland in the United States cost $3,160 in 2020.234 Nationally, agricultural
realty values doubled between 2004 and 2013 and, in many places, are still
rising. 235 In 2014, the Economist determined that farmland had outper-
formed most other asset classes for the previous 20 years and had delivered
average U.S. returns of 12% a year with low volatility. 236 Some farmland val-
ues have increased more than twice as fast as the Dow Jones Industrial Aver-
age, and in addition to appreciation, farmland ownership comes with a po-
potential steady annual return, including from rents. 237 So, why sell?
The law also indirectly inflates values by failing to preserve a stable land
supply. Urbanization alone accounts for approximately one million new
acres of farmland lost each year—“the equivalent of adding new urban area
the size of Los Angeles, Houston and Phoenix combined.” 238 Other forces,
such as climate change and desertification, also reduce arable land bases.
California, for example, lost 1.4 million acres of arable land between 1984
and 2010. 239 Whether via zoning or effective climate regulation, the law has
not had a sufficient response, making remaining farmland all the more pre-
cious—and therefore, for some, difficult to acquire.
2. Wealth-Retention Policies
The next category of policies includes a host of financial incentives that
actively encourage and support landholding by current-generation owners
232. Katy Keiffer, Who Really Owns American Farmland?, COUNTER (July 31, 2017, 9:31
AM), https://thecounter.org/who-really-owns-american-farmland [https://perma.cc/W7SP-
GCSS].
233. Wendong Zhang, 2019 Iowa State University Land Value Survey: Overview 2 (Iowa
St. Univ., Ctr. for Agric. & Rural Dev. Working Paper No. 19-WP 597, 2019), https://
www.card.iastate.edu/farmland/isu-survey/2019/2019-ISU-Land-Value-Survey-Overview.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JHU2-VQ3G].
234. Econ. Rsch. Serv., Farmland Value, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (Nov. 2, 2020), https://
www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/land-use-land-value-tenure/farmland-value
[https://perma.cc/4LBN-QP4M].
235. ACKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 37 (citing NAT’L AGRIC. STAT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., LAND VALUES 2016 SUMMARY (2016), https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu
/usda-esmis/files/pn89d6567/w6634626d/9019s523z/AgriLandVa-08-05-2016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MBT7-JRG4]).
236. Barbarians at the Farm Gate: Hardy Investors Are Seeking a Way to Grow Their
Money, ECONOMIST (Dec. 30, 2014), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics
/2014/12/30/barbarians-at-the-farm-gate [https://perma.cc/R4WU-MHJX].
237. Keiffer, supra note 232.
238. Dave Merrill & Lauren Leatherby, Here’s How America Uses Its Land, BLOOMBERG
(July 31, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-us-land-use [https://perma.cc
/4CM9-UDKA].
239. CALO & PETERSEN-ROCKNEY, supra note 92, at 3.
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and their next-generation heirs. There are numerous examples of this policy,
but in this Section I focus briefly on two: (1) tax policy preferencing owners’
choices to hold onto land until their death and (2) property reforms to allow
more dynastic control of landed wealth.
First, the tax treatment of agricultural lands is designed to encourage
owners to hold lands as long as possible. Selling appreciated agricultural
property results in taxable capital gains, but heirs and devisees receive a
“stepped-up” basis if the land passes through the owner’s estate at death, ef-
fectively erasing any tax liability on that appreciation. The exemption of a
person’s first $11.7 million in assets—or $23.4 million for a married cou-
ple—from any federal estate tax under current law also, for those without the
most extreme wealth, creates no incentive to divest assets before death. 240
Collectively, these policies encourage current-generation owners to hold
land until death so it can pass through their estates without tax. 241
Likewise, Section 1031 of the Federal Tax Code excludes certain like-
kind exchanges of real property from immediate tax liability. 242 These 1031
exchanges allow taxpayers to exchange “like-kind” property—usually in-
vestment real estate—without immediate tax consequences, allowing the de-
ferral of any otherwise recognized tax gains at the time of the exchange until
a later sale or non-like-kind exchange. 243 These tax-deferred exchange vehi-
cles tend to privilege existing real-property owners as beneficiaries of unique
tax advantages that encourage ongoing real property ownership—including
farmland. 244
Next, the Rule Against Perpetuities has traditionally prevented people
from tying up their property too long after their death by requiring living
owners to have full control over property decisions. Another recent dramatic
change has occurred in the realm of perpetuities reform, with many states
240. Rocky Mengle, Estate Tax Exemption Amount Goes Up for 2021, KIPLINGER (Oct.
27, 2020), https://www.kiplinger.com/taxes/601639/estate-tax-exemption [https://perma.cc
/2P9F-9T4M].
241. ACKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 64. Of course, this does not explain next-generation
choices. Some proposals for improving land access for next-generation farmers include creat-
ing capital gains tax exclusions for farmers who sell farmland, during life, to qualified young,
beginning, socially disadvantaged, or veteran farmers. Id.
242. I.R.C. § 1031.
243. See Bradley T. Borden, The Like-Kind Exchange Equity Conundrum, 60 FLA. L. REV.
643, 646 (2008) (describing popularity of these exchanges).
244. See, e.g., Roger A. McEowen, Like-Kind Exchange Issues, AGRIC. L. & TAX’N BLOG
(June 5, 2017), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/agriculturallaw/2017/06/like-kind-exchange
-issues.html [https://perma.cc/2GYS-ESKQ] (“Like-kind exchanges are very popular in agri-
culture.”); see also Roger McEowen, Like-Kind Exchange Treatment Allowed for Transfer of
Farmland Held in Trust, IOWA ST. UNIV. CTR. AGRIC. L. & TAX’N (May 21, 2009), https://
www.calt.iastate.edu/article/kind-exchange-treatment-allowed-transfer-farmland-held-trust
[https://perma.cc/UN5B-LV59]; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don’t Need Another
Hero, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 397 (1987) (critiquing purpose and effect of 1031 exchange benefits).
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weakening the Rule Against Perpetuities or abolishing it altogether. 245 These
reforms allow, for example, so-called dynasty trusts, which generally permit
more strategic long-term control and maintenance of wealth within genera-
tions of families. 246 Perhaps unsurprisingly, one recent Iowa study showed a
trend toward more trust ownership of Iowa farmland. 247
And while these trusts could include provisions directing the trustee to
make decisions promoting conservation or sustainability, most do not.
USDA data show that 14% of rented farm acres were owned and controlled
by a trust in 2014, and of all the lands anticipated to be transferred outside of
a will instrument between 2014 and 2019, USDA estimated another 37% (or
34.5 million) would be put into a trust. 248
3. Racialized Insecurity
Both categories of policies—inflating land values and incentivizing land
retention over multiple generations—operate to keep land in its existing
class of (predominantly white) owners. They also increase the cost of new
land acquisition in a way that privileges purchases, when they occur, by
wealthy buyers and investors, to the disadvantage of undercapitalized new
market entrants. By keeping land in existing (white) families or in new in-
vestment vehicles, we keep other emergent farmers and ranchers out.
But this Section highlights another difficult truth. Even when minority
farmers do acquire land, they are more likely to lose it than their white coun-
terparts, and the lands they do retain tend to get weaker and more fragment-
ed over time. Part of this history of modern land loss by farmers and ranchers
of color is the result of explicit discrimination, including systematic discrim-
ination against African Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, and women
in USDA farm programs. 249 Despite resolution of these past claims, today
245. Eric Kades, Of Piketty and Perpetuities: Dynastic Wealth in the Twenty-First Century
(and Beyond), 60 B.C. L. REV. 145, 178–79 (2019) (collecting examples of “over half the states”
that have abolished, effectively, the Rule Against Perpetuities).
246. Id. at 147. In most cases, the land itself (the trust corpus) must be alienable by the
trustee, but as a valuable investment, see supra Section III.C.2, it can be more easily maintained
over generations in this dynastic trust, cf. Kades, supra note 245, at 147 n.6 (noting sample re-
quirements that trustee maintain powers of alienation).
247. WENDONG ZHANG, ALEJANDRO PLASTINA & WENDIAM SAWADGO, IOWA ST. UNIV.
EXTENSION & OUTREACH, IOWA FARMLAND OWNERSHIP AND TENURE SURVEY, 1982–2017: A
THIRTY-FIVE YEAR PERSPECTIVE 4 (2018), https://store.extension.iastate.edu/product/6492
[https://perma.cc/UR88-99FL] (“In particular, trusts accounted for 20 percent of all acres in
Iowa as of July 2017, while three decades ago almost no land was owned in that fashion.”).
248. BIGELOW ET AL., U.S. FARMLAND OWNERSHIP, supra note 48, at 17 tbl.2, 34 tbl.5.
249. See, e.g., Garcia v. Vilsack, 563 F.3d 519 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Love v. Connor, 525 F.
Supp. 2d 155 (D.D.C. 2007); Keepseagle v. Johanns, 236 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2006); Pigford v.
Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 82–86 (D.D.C. 1999). For analysis of these cases, see Stephen Carpenter,
The USDA Discrimination Cases: Pigford, In re Black Farmers, Keepseagle, Garcia, and Love, 17
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 1 (2012). Both the Pigford (African American) and Keepseagle (Native Ameri-
can) cases successfully resulted in significant settlements for class members. TADLOCK COWAN
& JODY FEDER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS20430, THE PIGFORD CASES: USDA SETTLEMENT OF
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97.8% of all farm program payments still go to white farmers, with white
farmers receiving an average payment of $10,022 per farm while Black farm-
ers, for example, receive an average payment of only $5,509 per farm. 250 On-
going but difficult-to-police private discrimination in agricultural and real-
estate markets also creates unique obstacles for farmers and ranchers of col-
or,251 and this may also impact access to other rights and relief provided by law,
with access to justice generally already a concern for many rural residents. 252
Implicit in all of these variables, however, is one final dimension of
American property design that should not be overlooked: it takes wealth
and, often, social capital to maintain owner status. Title maintenance, prop-
erty taxes, and probate proceedings all require money. These costs are neu-
tral in that they are universally applied, and they can sometimes serve as
beneficial and intentional “boundaries” built into the land system to reduce
risks of overfragmentation in land and to facilitate the movement of valuable
resources to best users in efficiently sized bundles of ownership. 253 But the
reality is that these rules as we have designed them disproportionately im-
pact minority owners who are more likely to be undercapitalized or underre-
DISCRIMINATION SUITS BY BLACK FARMERS 2–4 (2013); Bill Chappell, U.S. Reaches $680M
Deal with Native American Farmers, NPR (Oct. 19, 2010, 3:53 PM), https://www.npr.org
/sections/thetwo-way/2010/10/19/130678317/u-s-reaches-deal-with-native-american-farmers
[https://perma.cc/C4R9-9DKW]. The female and Hispanic plaintiffs did not succeed in court
but were made part of the statutory claims resolution process created by Congress, with $1.33
billion in relief to these groups. JODY FEDER & TADLOCK COWAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40988,
GARCIA V. VILSACK: A POLICY AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A USDA DISCRIMINATION CASE 5, 11–
12 (2013); OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., HISPANIC AND WOMEN
FARMERS AND RANCHERS CLAIM RESOLUTION PROCESS 1–2 (2016), https://www.usda.gov
/sites/default/files/50601-0002-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6XH-8K62]; see also Food, Conser-
vation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 14011, 122 Stat. 923, 1447.
250. AYAZI & ELSHEIKH, supra note 77, at 51. As this Article was being finalized for pub-
lication, President Biden signed COVID-related stimulus legislation that includes approxi-
mately $5 billion in spending to directly support minority farmers, including significant debt
relief and other assistance to redress some of this history of discrimination and unequal farm-
program support. See Laura Reiley, Relief Bill Is Most Significant Legislation for Black Farmers
Since Civil Rights Act, Experts Say, WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2021, 8:15 PM), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/03/08/reparations-black-farmers-stimulus [https://perma.cc
/XNV7-DDBQ].
251. See Adam Calo & Kathryn Teigen De Master, After the Incubator: Factors Impeding
Land Access Along the Path from Farmworker to Proprietor, J. AGRIC. FOOD SYS. & CMTY. DEV.,
Winter 2015–2016, at 111.
252. See generally Lisa R. Pruitt, Amanda L. Kool, Lauren Sudeall, Michele Statz, Danielle
M. Conway & Hannah Haksgaard, Legal Deserts: A Multi-state Perspective on Rural Access to
Justice, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15 (2018) (providing a survey of rural communities’ access to
justice across six states). There are simply fewer lawyers in rural spaces, and where they do ex-
ist, their interactions with rural residents are often punitive, involving criminal proceedings or
possibly tax assessments. See, e.g., JACOB KANG-BROWN & RAM SUBRAMANIAN, VERA INST. OF
JUST., OUT OF SIGHT: THE GROWTH OF JAILS IN RURAL AMERICA 12 fig.3 (2017),
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/out-of-sight-growth-of-jails-rural-america.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G4AL-GWC8] (finding pretrial incarceration rates in rural counties rose
436% between 1970 and 2013, outpacing urban and suburban incarceration areas).
253. Heller, supra note 192, at 1165–82.
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sourced. 254 The legal obligations placed on landowners are a public choice,
and to the extent the law creates burdens that dispossess minority landown-
ers in particular, that is a problem that can be fixed. 255 This Section very
briefly notes three specific examples of racialized land insecurity created by
the size of legal obstacles and costs.
a. Informal Ownership
First, minority landowners are most likely to claim real property without
a clear marketable title. 256 These unrecorded claims to property arise perhaps
most commonly when a record owner passes away and the heirs do not for-
malize a transfer of title, either by failing to access probate procedures or
other incomplete legal steps. 257 The result is that heirs in possession have a
claim to property but not a perfected legal title, which in turn impacts their
ability to access numerous benefits of property ownership, from credit based
on the security of title to federal farm or disaster assistance programs, which
require record proof of ownership. For example, many of the informal “co-
lonias” settlements along the border with Mexico contain untitled claims to
property. 258 Many residents purchased property (or attempted to purchase
property) through installment contracts, which require the buyer to bear the
full risk of loss. 259 If the buyer defaults under the contract, the seller can can-
cel the contract, keep title, recover possession, and retain past payments as
liquidated damages—with no equity to the buyer. 260
Informality has its benefits, including low transaction costs, general flex-
ibility, and more space for adherence to local community norms. But it also
poses the tremendous risk that one’s rights will not be recognized into the
future and that the benefits of property ownership—including the ability to
use one’s property as collateral to access credit or to prove ownership for
federal programs—may be denied. These informal settlements are often “ra-
254. See Audrey G. McFarlane, The Properties of Instability: Markets, Predation, Racial-
ized Geography, and Property Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855.
255. Although this Section focuses on racialized insecurity, it is important to note the
unique (and in some ways opposite) challenges of hyperregulated and largely inalienable prop-
erty rights in modern American Indian reservations. I have written about this unique challenge
separately. See generally Jessica A. Shoemaker, Complexity’s Shadow: American Indian Proper-
ty, Sovereignty, and the Future, 115 MICH. L. REV. 487 (2017).
256. Jane E. Larson, Informality, Illegality, and Inequality, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 137,
158 (2002) (showing that informal property—driven in part by its inherently hidden nature—
disproportionately affects nonwhites, non-English speakers, and females).
257. See Heather K. Way, Informal Homeownership in the United States and the Law, 29
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 113, 151 (2009).
258. See Guadalupe T. Luna, “Facts Are Stubborn Things:” Irregular Housing in the Texas
Colonias, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 121, 142–43 (2013); Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep
in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L.J. 179 (1995).
259. Way, supra note 257, at 128–30; see also PETER M. WARD, COLONIAS AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN TEXAS AND MEXICO 91 (1999).
260. Way, supra note 257, at 128–31.
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cially obvious,” with nearly exclusive Latino or African American residents,
and the law has not addressed either the roots of peoples’ need for these in-
formal claims or the ways in which our land governance system facilitates
these dynamics by design. 261
b. Heir Property and Co-ownership Risks
Second, heir property is a general term that refers to two separate but re-
lated problems: (1) lack of title in inherited property if the land was not for-
mally probated and (2) co-ownership among multiple heirs, which requires
coordination among numerous owners for many land-use decisions and
transactions. Both co-ownership or lack of title can create challenges for ac-
cessing farm programs. 262 For example, two sisters farming on family land in
North Carolina described how their farm needed drainage work, but they
were unable to apply for federal drainage support programs because neph-
ews in New York City refused to consent to the land changes, although they
had no real interest in or connection to the land. 263
Co-ownership, however, also produces unique forms of insecurity. Pro-
fessor Thomas Mitchell, for example, has documented how the design of co-
ownership rules—and the power of any single owner to force a partition sale
of heir property in particular—has dramatically increased Black land loss. 264
The pervasiveness of these co-ownership issues among African American
farmers in the South in particular is well documented, and the design of co-
ownership rules dictate how challenging this status is. 265
261. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion at the
Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2008) (describing sample settlements of this type
as “racially obvious” with nearly exclusive Latino or African American residents).
262. See Lizzie Presser, Kicked Off the Land: Why So Many Black Families Are Losing
Their Property, NEW YORKER (July 15, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/07
/22/kicked-off-the-land [https://perma.cc/KZH8-9DPC].
263. Natasha Bowens, The Color of Food: These Sisters Are Building a Second Career as
Farmers, CIV. EATS (Apr. 24, 2015), http://civileats.com/2015/04/24/the-color-of-food-these-
sisters-are-building-a-second-career-as-farmers [https://perma.cc/7YM5-8BY4].
264. See Mitchell, supra note 143. Co-ownership (or, in this context, fractionation) in
American Indian trust allotments is a related, but differently managed, concern. See Shoemak-
er, supra note 125.
265. See, e.g., B. James Deaton, Jamie Baxter & Carolyn S. Bratt, Examining the Conse-
quences and Character of “Heir Property,” 68 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 2344 (2009); B. James Dea-
ton, Land “in Heirs”: Building a Hypothesis Concerning Tenancy in Common and the
Persistence of Poverty in Central Appalachia, J. APPALACHIAN STUD., Spring/Fall 2005, at 83; B.
James Deaton, Intestate Succession and Heir Property: Implications for Future Research on the
Persistence of Poverty in Central Appalachia, 41 J. ECON. ISSUES 927 (2007).
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c. Disproportionate Leasing Rates
Finally, minority farmers are also more likely to lease land to farm than
own it. 266 Most tenant farmers rent lands on short-term cash leases. 267 Two
Iowa studies, for example, revealed that one-third of farm leases were oral,
and 81% of leases failed to set a fixed term, making them a default year-to-
year tenancy in most cases. 268 Short-term leases limit farmers’ production
choices, precluding crops—like asparagus or ginseng, for example—that re-
quire multi-year growing seasons, and also impede, in some cases, credit ac-
cess. 269 Unlike leases with longer terms or crop-share payment agreements,
short cash leases place more economic risks on the farmer, 270 and in any
lease arrangement, the tenant always risks the landlords changing their
minds and ending land access, including after a tenant has made uncompen-
sated improvements to the property. 271
Some leasing of farmland has advantages, including lower-stakes oppor-
tunities to begin initial farming endeavors, but the law currently does not
support tenant farmers in all the ways it could to make these tenure ar-
rangements as equitable and secure as possible. 272
266. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
267. E.g., Hamilton, supra note 203, at 353.
268. MICHAEL DUFFY, DARNELL SMITH, WILLIAM EDWARDS & BECKY JOHNSON, IOWA
ST. UNIV. EXTENSION, SURVEY OF IOWA LEASING PRACTICES, 2007, at 2 (2008), http://econ2
.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/duffy/documents/c2-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFV6-6VFR] (report-
ing that 67% of all leased acres in Iowa in 2007 were under a written lease); MICHAEL DUFFY,
WILLIAM EDWARDS & ANN JOHANNS, IOWA ST. UNIV. EXTENSION & OUTREACH, SURVEY OF
IOWA LEASING PRACTICES, 2012, at 2 (2013) http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/duffy
/documents/c2-15_2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/E89N-39UH] (reporting that 19% of all leased
acres in Iowa in 2012 were under fixed-term leases); see also Jesse J. Richardson Jr., Land Ten-
ure and Sustainable Agriculture, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 799, 806 (2016) (discussing these data
and clarifying that when there is no fixed term in a lease, the default is a year-to-year term).
269. Calo & De Master, supra note 251, at 111, 120.
270. See Hamilton, supra note 203, at 353.
271. E.g., ACKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 35 (providing a case study of female-owned
farm going out of business after investing in long-term soil improvements and then having oral
lease revoked).
272. E.g., ROBERT PARSONS ET AL., RESEARCH REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM
THE FARMLASTS PROJECT, at ii (2010), https://s30428.pcdn.co/wpcontent/uploads/sites/2
/2019/09/FarmLASTSResearchReport_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SQD-EHPM] (suggesting
both renting and owning should be pursued); Scrufari, supra note 102, at 513–14 (describing
use of longer-term lease arrangements, including ground leases that allow the tenant to own
buildings and structures and rent the underlying land on a long-term basis). Other concerns
about leasing focus on tenants’ lack of incentive to invest in long-term sustainability and land
improvements. See Richardson, supra note 268, at 800 (articulating the “tenancy hypothesis,”
which is the assumption that “tenants have little incentive to make long-term investments in
the property since the tenant has no stake in the land beyond the term of the lease”); Edward
Cox, A Lease-Based Approach to Sustainable Farming, Part I: Farm Tenancy Trends and the
Outlook for Sustainability on Rented Land, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 369, 370–71 (2010). A
“toolbox” of materials to assist both landowners and farmers in negotiating equitable lease ar-
rangements with an eye toward promoting sustainable agricultural practices is available. See
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IV. RE-DESIGNING PROPERTY: NEW AGRARIAN FUTURES
There is something painfully familiar about the sum of all these parts:
concentration of land in the hands of fewer, more powerful, and often hered-
itary white landowners and a sense that those not born into wealth (and
landed wealth especially) cannot realistically acquire it. We creep toward the
feudalism that America’s agrarian property visions were determined to avoid.
Property law, and particularly the fee simple, is not to blame for all of
these access issues. Society’s current inequalities have many roots. Yet, agri-
cultural lands are public goods with important public functions, and it war-
rants asking whether our systems for managing and allocating these resources
are still serving the public good. 273 If there is doubt about how public these
lands really are, despite their private ownership, simply imagine a world in
which all government subsidies currently inflating and supporting agricul-
tural land values are eliminated. Without public support, farming would be
an even more volatile endeavor and land prices would almost certainly de-
flate. It is nearly impossible to imagine agriculture without government sup-
port, which only underlines how public these land-tenure choices are.
This final Part provides a brief summary of current land-access policy
efforts and then begins to think about new property designs that may both
protect and expand minority property rights and rebuild more sustainable
rural communities. In the urban context, property scholars have contributed
significant creativity to property design and revealed that property is much
more dynamic and pluralistic than our intuitions may first suggest. 274 This
Part ultimately argues that rural property, too, deserves this transformational
work and suggests a series of sample reforms in hopes of sparking more spe-
cific creative work.
A. Current Policy Efforts and Ideas
Both governmental and private farm-advocacy groups have previously
identified lack of affordable land access as beginning farmers’ most specific
obstacle. 275 This concern has already inspired significant attention and advo-
Leasing: Farmland Access Legal Toolkit, CTR. AGRIC. & FOOD SYS., https://farmlandaccess.org
/leasing-resources [https://perma.cc/5LGC-LRDG].
273. See generally ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE COMMON GOOD (2003) (arguing private landownership is a flexible institution that has
been, and should be, continually reshaped for collective goals).
274. See, e.g., Brandon M. Weiss, Progressive Property Theory and Housing Justice Cam-
paigns, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 251 (2019) (recounting evolution of property law and policy
changes in light of housing justice movements and suggesting incorporation in broader pro-
gressive property theory and literature); Fennell, supra note 35 (advancing even greater reform
proposals for new property estates to advance urban-property redevelopment); Lisa T. Alexan-
der, Community in Property: Lessons from Tiny Homes Villages, 104 MINN. L. REV. 385 (2019)
(advancing new stewardship tenure form for cohousing rights in communities, including tiny
home villages for unhoused people).
275. E.g., ACKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 38.
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cacy, but most responses have been largely confined to efforts that accept the
legal and property system as it currently exists and seek to facilitate more
transactions within this existing framework. This Section summarizes recent
federal activity on these issues and then highlights specific examples of non-
profit and state-level efforts.
1. Federal Action (and Inaction)
At the federal level, during the Obama Administration, USDA Secretary
Tom Vilsack appointed a Subcommittee on Land Tenure within the USDA’s
Advisory Committee on Beginning Farmers and Ranchers in 2014. 276 That
land-tenure subcommittee produced a report with recommendations for
improving beginning-farmer land access, but the words “race,” “gender,”
“ethnicity,” and “socially disadvantaged” do not appear in the final report. 277
Although the report did include some proposed reforms and areas for fur-
ther study, it is also unclear whether any of these proposals have come to fru-
ition. Instead, most of USDA’s current efforts continue to focus on grants to
support skills-training and business planning for new farmers, without spe-
cific provision for any kind of direct land access. 278
There are a few other federal programs of note, including the Agricul-
tural Conservation Easement Program (ACEP) and the Conservation Re-
serve Program/Transition Incentives Program (CRP-TIP). 279 ACEP helps
participants purchase development rights to conserve agricultural land for
the future. Though this does not address new entrants’ access directly, it does
at least seek to preserve future supply of agricultural lands. 280 The CRP-TIP
276. In 2014, Secretary Vilsack was serving as Secretary of Agriculture in the Obama
Administration. He has since been reappointed and reconfirmed as the Secretary of Agricul-
ture (as of this writing) under the new Biden Administration. Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vil-
sack, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.usda.gov/our-agency/about-usda/our-secretary
[https://perma.cc/PCC9-JDLA].
277. ADVISORY COMM. ON BEGINNING FARMERS & RANCHERS, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
LAND TENURE, ACCESS, AND FARM BUSINESS TRANSITIONS FOR BEGINNING FARMERS AND
RANCHERS (2015) [hereinafter USDA SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT]. The report does however
mention the issues of heir property in “the rural southeastern portion of the United States” and
highlights a “report entitled ‘The Impact of Heir Property on Black Rural Land Tenure in the
Southeastern Region of the United States’ by the Emergency Land Fund.” Id. at 22. There is
also a final section calling for USDA to pay more attention to, and better coordinate with, pro-
ducers living and farming within Indian country. Id. at 23–25.
278. See Farmers Seeking Land, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://newfarmers.usda.gov/farmers-
seeking-land [https://perma.cc/E3TG-MRRF]; see also BIGELOW ET AL., U.S. FARMLAND
OWNERSHIP, supra note 48, at 40–41; FARM SERV. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARM LOANS
OVERVIEW: FACT SHEET (2020), https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles
/FactSheets/farm_loans_overview-factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/T244-D3DD].
279. ACKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 12.
280. Nat. Res. Conservation Serv., Agricultural Conservation Easement Program, U.S.
DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/easements
/acep [https://perma.cc/5VAU-RXWZ] (outlining federal payments up to 50% of easement
purchase price).
June 2021] Fee Simple Failures 1741
is also designed to preserve farmland through conservation measures, but it
adds a financial incentive of one extra year of conservation payments if an
existing owner transitions their farm to a beginning or socially disadvan-
taged farmer during the term of the contract. 281 Advocacy groups have ar-
gued, unsuccessfully, for significant expansion of these and related programs
to encourage additional farm transfers. 282
During the 2018 Farm Bill negotiations, three different bills were drafted
to provide more concrete financial and other support to beginning farmers,
including for land access, but these were not passed despite some early re-
ports of bipartisan support.283 Instead, the 2018 Farm Bill required “the Sec-
retary of Agriculture, in consultation with the Chief Economist” to make
(another) publicly available report identifying barriers to farmland access for
beginning and socially disadvantaged farmers, the efficacy of existing federal
programs in addressing the problem, and possible legal changes to improve
the situation. 284 The Farm Bill also requires a report at least every three years
on farmland ownership, tenure, transition, and entry of beginning farmers
and ranchers and socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers. 285
Elsewhere in the USDA, there is recognition also that “[s]ocially disad-
vantaged farmer[s] and rancher[s]” (racial and ethnic minorities, women,
and LGBTQ farmers) do face extra layers of farming challenges. 286 As a spe-
281. E.g., USDA SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 277, at 4–5 (suggesting expanding
existing transition incentives through CRP); id. at 6, 21 (proposing various federal tax incen-
tives for farm transitions, building on state models in Nebraska and Iowa); see also FARM SERV.
AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., LOANS FOR SOCIALLY DISADVANTAGED FARMERS AND
RANCHERS: FACT SHEET (2019), https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles
/FactSheets/2019/sda_loans-fact_sheet-aug_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/TXJ6-MDBZ] (provid-
ing two additional years of CRP payments if owners sell or rent to beginning farmers or to
members of a socially disadvantaged group).
282. E.g., CALO & PETERSEN-ROCKNEY, supra note 92, at 3–5 (advocating for financial re-
sources for farmers, legal incentives for land transfers, and more farmland-protection measures);
see supra note 272 and accompanying text.
283. Margiana Petersen-Rockney, Last Chance in This Farm Bill for Beginning Farmers
and Our Farmland, NAT’L YOUNG FARMERS COAL. (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.youngfarmers
.org/2018/10/lastchance [https://perma.cc/J9XS-G4J5]. These early proposed bills were H.R.
4316, H.R. 4201, and S. 2762. Id.; see also CALO & PETERSEN-ROCKNEY, supra note 92, at 5.
284. Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-334, § 12607(a), 132 Stat. 4490,
5006 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2204i(a)).
285. Id. § 12607(b) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2204i(b)).
286. Socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers are farmers and ranchers who “have
been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudices because of their identity as members of a group
without regard to their individual qualities” and include African Americans, American Indians
or Alaska Natives, Hispanics, and Asians or Pacific Islanders. See 7 U.S.C. § 2279(a)(5)–(6);
OFF. OF P’SHIPS & PUB. ENGAGEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARMING OPPORTUNITIES
TRAINING AND OUTREACH GRANT PROGRAM, https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/2501_FactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/PB58-GF84]; see also Calo & De Master,
supra note 251, at 125; Hannah Alsgaard, Rural Inheritance: Gender Disparities in Farm
Transmission, 88 N.D. L. REV. 347 (2012) (exploring how social and cultural “grooming” leads
to assumptions that sons, not daughters, should take over farm operations); PARSONS ET AL.,
supra note 272, at 3 (noting “additional challenges in acquiring farmland” for socially disad-
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cific response to racial and ethnic inequities in farming, Congress established
the Outreach and Assistance for Socially Disadvantaged Farmers and Ranch-
ers and Veteran Farmers and Ranchers Program, also known as the 2501
Program. The program is intended to provide outreach, education, and
technical assistance to help these farmers access USDA programs. The 2501
Program, however, has been chronically underfunded. 287 The USDA also ac-
cords preferential treatment to socially disadvantaged farmers in certain
programs, with authority to set aside 5% of available funds for certain con-
servation programs and Farm Service Agency loans for farmland purchases,
but these numbers have been criticized as too little and too poorly commu-
nicated to be effective. 288
As this Article was being finalized for publication, Senator Cory Booker,
along with several other cosponsors, introduced the Justice for Black Farm-
ers Act, a bold legislative proposal that would, among other things, federally
fund significant open-market purchases of farmland for redistribution to
new and existing Black farmers. 289 The mere proposal of such an Act marks a
dramatic shift in political attention and thinking about the plight of farm-
land access, at least for Black farmers specifically, but it has also been cri-
tiqued for continuing to envision “solutions” that accept a more widely
broken food and land-tenure system. 290 The future of this proposed legisla-
tion is of course uncertain, but its introduction may have also helped spur
support for the approximately $5 billion in debt relief and other farm-
support spending for socially disadvantaged farmers promised in the most
recent COVID-related stimulus legislation. 291 Perhaps most importantly, the
conversation continues and focus on racial equity in agriculture seems to be
increasing.
vantaged populations, including “persistent discrimination, cultural and language barriers, and
fractionated heir property”).
287. See AYAZI & ELSHEIKH, supra note 77, at 68.
288. JACOB E. GERSEN, MARGOT J. POLLANS & MICHAEL T. ROBERTS, FOOD LAW 75–77
(2019).
289. Press Release, Sen. Cory Booker, Booker, Warren, Gillibrand, Smith, Warnock, and
Leahy Announce Comprehensive Bill to Address the History of Discrimination in Federal Ag-
ricultural Policy, (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/booker-warren-
gillibrand-smith-warnock-and-leahy-announce-comprehensive-bill-to-address-the-history-of-
discrimination-in-federal-agricultural-policy [https://perma.cc/X3BG-HXMZ]; see also Tom
Philpott, Black Farmers Have Been Robbed of Land. A New Bill Would Give Them a “Quantum
Leap” Toward Justice., MOTHER JONES (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.motherjones.com/food
/2020/11/black-farmers-have-been-robbed-of-land-a-new-bill-would-give-them-a-quantum-
leap-toward-justice [https://perma.cc/5D5Y-K34U] (describing more of the political context of
this effort).
290. E.g., Chris Newman, The Justice for Black Farmers Act: A Critical BIPOC Review,
MEDIUM (Dec. 5, 2020), https://sylvanaqua.medium.com/the-justice-for-black-farmers-act-a-
critical-bipoc-review-459875f0158e [https://perma.cc/YBY6-SLGV] (critiquing proposal as “a
coarse attempt to add Black people to an already broken agricultural system”).
291. Reiley, supra note 250.
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2. State and Charitable Endeavors
Other land-access policy responses tend to focus on the economics of
land and credit markets, rather than proposing any changes to the ownership
infrastructure itself. Generally, these reforms include modest efforts to facili-
tate making more farmland available for purchase and increasing the financial
capacity of new farmers to purchase those lands. Sample tools in place (in-
cluding many through private nonprofits and charitable land trusts) include
• loan guarantees or subsidized farm-purchase loans; 292
• state tax incentives for landowners to rent their farmland to begin-
ning farmers, with tax incentives for land actively used for farming
and further incentives if that use is by a beginning farmer; 293
• matchmaking programs designed to connect retiring or exiting
farmers with new entrants; 294 and
• individual development accounts designed to match, often through
philanthropic efforts, savings by aspiring new farmers. 295
Because most farmland is already owned by someone as farmland (that
is, we can’t and don’t create much new farming capacity out of otherwise
nonagricultural lands), other efforts have focused on creating incentives for
farm transitions that result in land sales to new farmers. As many as 90% of
farmers and farmland owners “neither have an exit plan nor know how to
develop one.” 296 Only 30% of farmers planning to retire have even completed
the first step of identifying a desired successor. 297 Thus, many beginning-
292. PARSONS ET AL., supra note 272, at 17.
293. E.g., Jordan Rasmussen, Beginning Farmer Tax Credit Benefits New and Retiring
Farmers, CTR. RURAL AFFS. (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.cfra.org/blog/beginning-farmer-tax-
credit-benefits-new-and-retiring-farmers [https://perma.cc/8FXP-2QKT].
294. See, e.g., PARSONS ET AL., supra note 272, at 19; KATHRYN RUHF, LAND FOR GOOD,
DEVELOPING & STRENGTHENING FARM LINK PROGRAMS (2019), https://landforgood.org/wp-
content/uploads/LFG-Farm-Link-Guide-Developing-and-Strengthening-Farm-Link-
Programs.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA84-WUDN].
295. See, e.g., Molly Bloom, Karen Adler & Margaret Knox, CAL. FARMLINK, A GUIDE TO
DEVELOPING AND OPERATING AN AGRICULTURAL INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNT
(IDA) PROGRAM (2014), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PDUxhTPgO6rZLi6A7XqvrSFI1-
Yq7YNa [https://perma.cc/C4XQ-7P7B]. Many of these programs focus on new-farmer access,
regardless of status. But some states are addressing equity more directly. For example, in Cali-
fornia, the state with the highest proportion of diversity in farmer and rancher sectors, the
Farmer Equity Act is intended to create a governance framework that includes socially disad-
vantaged farmers and ranchers in decisionmaking, addressing both historic and ongoing rac-
ism in agriculture. CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 510–514 (West 2018); see also CALO &
PETERSEN-ROCKNEY, supra note 92, at 5.
296. PARSONS ET AL., supra note 272, at 3.
297. Id.
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farmer discussions also focus on farm-succession planning and incentives. 298
Some proposals have suggested requiring beginning farmers to have a will as
a prerequisite for farm-program participation, but this could be extended or
refined—having a will, on its own, of course has no correlation with the like-
lihood of land being opened for new entrants to farming. 299
Still other efforts focus on more direct support for new farmers. For ex-
ample, a handful of successful farm incubator programs exist in specific lo-
cations. In general, these incubators include direct land-access opportunities
or direct subsidies for rent payments from private lands. 300 These incubators
are mostly, but not exclusively, private. 301 Many also target diverse popula-
tions explicitly, including immigrant farmworkers and refugees. 302 Although
these are bold programs that seek to directly address land-access challenges,
in many cases their impact is limited by scarce resources and perhaps a sur-
prising degree of difficulty in transitioning new farmers out of the incubator
and into any kind of stable tenure outside of the program. 303 Many factors
contribute to this, including the possibility of private discrimination, but the
small size of these incubator projects currently means that they can typically
only offer temporary access for a small number of new entrants. Upon com-
pletion of the program, these new farmers still struggle with the same access
challenges outside the incubator and “in the real world,” just with perhaps
more experience and sophistication in navigating agricultural markets.
Another significant charitable approach focuses on land trusts. These
trusts operate in diverse ways but typically include, at a minimum, acquisi-
tion of agricultural-conservation easements by the trust to protect vulnerable
lands for future agricultural uses and to secure future land supply to help
298. USDA SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 277, at 2 (focusing on life cycle of farm-
land use and transition); see also Scrufari, supra note 102, at 507–08 (modeling sample use of
LLC for gradual transition of farm from retiring farmer to new entrant); PARSONS ET AL., supra
note 272, at 2 (emphasizing “entry/exit connection” in policy proposals).
299. USDA SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 277, at 9–10 (imagining “having a will” as a
factor that could reduce a beginning farmer’s origination fees on federally guaranteed farm loans).
300. For a discussion of these programs, see, for example, Calo & De Master, supra note
251, at 111–12; PARSONS ET AL., supra note 272, at 24–25.
301. See, e.g., Jimmy Dula & Vanessa McCracken, Access to Land: Boulder County Land
Lease Program, NAT’L FARMERS UNION (Feb. 3, 2017), https://nfu.org/2017/02/03/access-to-
land-boulder-county-land-lease-program [https://perma.cc/A4XG-LB8H] (describing public
land-lease option in Boulder, Colorado); Tim Faulkner, R.I. Farm Purchase Program Targets
New Farmers, ECORI NEWS (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.ecori.org/farming/2018/4/16/ri-farm-
purchase-program-targets-new-farmers [https://perma.cc/FAL7-36TR] (describing Rhode Is-
land plan to bond funds to purchase farmland directly, at full price, and then sell it to begin-
ning farmers at a reduced agriculturally appraised value while retaining an agricultural-
conservation easement).
302. See Calo & De Master, supra note 251, at 112.
303. Id. at 113.
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maintain stable (and ideally more affordable) land pricing. 304 Many of these
efforts are supported by state-law tax incentives and state easement law.
A final group of efforts involve trying to combine the best of an incuba-
tor’s direct land access with the conservation and financing tools of a land
trust. Rather than just conserving farmland in general, these tools are in-
tended to actually help distribute land to new entrants who meet certain or-
ganizational objectives. For example, in Fresno, California, an organization
called Food Commons seeks to create a new organizational structure for lo-
calized, fair, and just food economies. 305 This includes a “Food Commons
Trust,” in which a nonprofit entity or trust would own and develop land and
other food-necessary facilities and then lease them at affordable rates to
small farmers and food enterprises. 306 Another group, Agrarian Trust, is
similarly working toward specific instances of community ownership and
governance of agricultural land through an effort to create a series of non-
profit landholding entities, including some intended to benefit new farmers.307
These programs are creative and important, but their influence is lim-
ited. In its survey of young farmers, the NYFC found land trusts and land-
linking programs tied for last place in a list of most helpful programs or in-
stitutions. 308 “In the past 20 years agricultural land trusts have bought and
preserved 6 million acres of farmland”—just a tiny slice of the overall pie. 309
In general, the size and scope of conservation and incubator strategies are
hampered by the amount of market resources that would have to be har-
nessed to address this market problem and all the anti-access features of the
fee simple and current land-tenure system designs. 310
304. E.g., Scrufari, supra note 102, at 508–12 (describing use of conservation easements
and state-sanctioned “Option to Purchase at Agricultural Value” (OPAV) rights to reduce and
stabilize values of agricultural lands).
305. See Summary, FOOD COMMONS, http://www.thefoodcommons.org/summary
[https://perma.cc/SG6K-WZDC].
306. The Vision, FOOD COMMONS, http://www.thefoodcommons.org/the-vision
[https://perma.cc/KFL8-3GEY]; Regional Food Commons as a Systemic Answer, DAVID
BOLLIER (Mar. 18, 2014, 8:22 PM), http://www.bollier.org/blog/regional-food-commons-
systemic-answer [https://perma.cc/APZ5-3WR5].
307. See About, AGRARIAN TR., https://agrariantrust.org/about [https://perma.cc/BH5B-
N6T4].
308. ACKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 50 (reporting that only 1% of respondents identi-
fied land trusts or land-linking programs as most helpful). Instead, the most helpful programs
included the Affordable Care Act, student-loan forgiveness, direct farm-operating loans, and
informal supports such as community-supported agriculture models and family or cultural
knowledge. Id.
309. Holt-Giménez, supra note 87, at 9.
310. See ACKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 40 (identifying land trusts as an important tool
in certain regions but noting some of these limitations and suggesting state and local govern-
ments and other nonprofits may also need to be partners for land access).
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B. Reform Approaches and Interest Convergence
The creative and dedicated work of so many of these food and farm ad-
vocates is deeply admirable. Yet the structural problems persist. The same
challenges that create barriers for new farmers and ranchers are also stacked
against these current advocacy efforts—not enough available land, not
enough access to capital, private and public racism, too many wealthy inves-
tors buying and consolidating agricultural real estate, and collective disre-
gard for the natural consequences of our current system of agriculture. This
next and final Section asks, fundamentally, whether it is time for more struc-
tural change: whether we can and should change the property rules that cre-
ate and exacerbate these land challenges in the first place.
This may sound like a big ask—and it is—but property is dynamic and
more ripe for reform than is often assumed. In the urban context, property
scholars are already engaged in a robust dialogue about whether more radi-
cal reforms to the fee simple are due, particularly to allow more nimble re-
sponses to rapid neighborhood-level change and growing wealth inequality. 311
Moreover, in recent housing justice campaigns, scholarship and practice
have combined to deploy a host of novel property reforms to address lack of
access to housing, especially among vulnerable groups. 312 This work has al-
ready brought us implied lease terms for residential housing, inclusionary
zoning reforms, rent controls, and even the evolution of new ownership
forms such as condominiums and common-interest communities, which are
relatively recent property innovations. Looking back, even our agricultural-
land history is rife with examples of what were, at the time, radical property
reforms—from the invention of Indian title to the implementation of the
novel homesteading program. In every case, our legal imaginations built new
systems to achieve the goals of the time. Why not use what we have learned
to reimagine a more just, equitable, and sustainable agricultural land-tenure
system for the world we live in now? This Section starts with a brief outline
of some guiding principles for such a reform process and then sketches some
early parameters for imagining these types of new property choices.
1. Guiding Principles and Grand Challenges
The goals of rural property reform warrant full public debate. Open is-
sues include: the most desirable size and structure of farmland ownership,
including whether owners are absentee or local; the types of agriculture, food
system, and agricultural markets to support; and who should own land and
with what responsibilities. Although more public engagement is needed, this
Section proposes three initial guiding principles that I propose to center.
Each has legal complexity that warrants further exploration, which I can ad-
dress only preliminarily here.
311. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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a. Reconnect Ownership and Active Stewardship
First, active, local control of local lands—or at least some agricultural lands—
is beneficial for communities and for the project of building a more sustain-
able and diversified agricultural economy and ecology. Connecting secure
ownership of land back to farmers and ranchers who have local knowledge
of and a physical relationship to the place serves many purposes. This physi-
cal connection can help repopulate certain vacant rural landscapes, encour-
age more sustainable and equitable farming practices, and reduce the social
costs of far-removed wealth concentration and land control. This kind of
shift in property design could be achieved in different ways, from an explicit
residency requirement to a carefully defined duty to cultivate—or steward or
tend or physically experience the space—as a condition of ownership. Alt-
hough there are many nuances to be developed, including the precise nature
of an owner’s in-person obligations, the guiding principle is that in some cas-
es we should encourage reconnecting agricultural landownership (wealth
and income) to use (experience and labor).
In a related but different context, nine Midwestern states sought to limit
absentee corporate ownership of farmland. 313 The Eighth Circuit invalidated
some of these laws under a (possibly strained) Dormant Commerce Clause
analysis, emphasizing that to the extent the state required an in-state resident
owner to actually possess and operate farms in a state—at least as a condition
of receiving the liability shield of corporate status—it discriminated against
out-of-state interests. 314 But not all of these laws have been struck down, and
the analysis has not been extended outside the Eighth Circuit. 315 The corpo-
rate farming laws are also distinct because they apply categorically to all in-
state versus out-of-state behavior, as opposed to more narrowly tailored,
property-specific use requirements.
Despite these cases, there are certainly strategies that remain to facilitate
an owner’s use requirement in certain types of agricultural tenure. Outside
313. See, e.g., Rick Welsh, Chantal Line Carpentier & Bryan Hubbell, On the Effectiveness
of State Anti-corporate Farming Laws in the United States, 26 FOOD POL’Y 543, 544 (2001). The
efficacy and design of these laws is subject to significant debate. For example, they do nothing
for the increasingly common family trusts that hold legacy farmland for the benefit of absentee
beneficiaries. See Neil D. Hamilton, Reaping What We Have Sown: Public Policy Consequences
of Agricultural Industrialization and the Legal Implications of a Changing Production System,
45 DRAKE L. REV. 289, 302 (1997) (articulating anti-industrialization focus of corporate farm-
ing laws).
314. See, e.g., Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 2006). For a very helpful synthesis of
corporate farming measures and their constitutional issues, see Anthony B. Schutz, Corporate-
Farming Measures in a Post-Jones World, 14 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 97 (2009).
315. For example, a federal judge recently upheld most of a North Dakota corporate
farming and ranching law, requiring only that the state must allow equivalent entities from
other states to also qualify for a family farm exception in the statute. See John Hageman, Judge
Declines to Strike Down Entire ND Anti-corporate Farming Law, but Calls One Provision ‘Dis-
criminatory,’ GRAND FORKS HERALD (Sept. 21, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.grandforksherald
.com/business/agriculture/4502910-judge-declines-strike-down-entire-nd-anti-corporate-
farming-law-calls [https://perma.cc/VU5M-2W3Z].
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the rural context, for example, owner-occupancy requirements in condo-
minium associations are regularly enforced, and lease terms prohibiting a
residential tenant from subleasing or assigning their tenancy (which, by de-
fault, creates an inalienable possession right) are also regularly upheld.
Moreover, market -participant exceptions to Dormant Commerce Clause
analysis could also provide an exception as long as the underlying title is
considered public. Federal authorization through direct Commerce Clause
regulation (such as a Farm Bill provision) would also authorize this change.
Moreover, property tenure forms—particularly to direct real property own-
ership that is permanently located only within one state’s borders—are per-
haps more inherently matters of state law, not interstate commerce. 316
b. Equity and Access
Second, opportunities to access agricultural land must be fair and equi-
table. If this Article has established anything, it must be that our current ag-
ricultural land-tenure system is built on a history of racial exclusion and that
it continues to reinforce structural exclusion of people of color from farm-
ing, food systems, and land ownership. New models of agricultural land ten-
ure can be part of a larger solution to rebuild new, racially just rural
communities and food systems.
At the same time, the reality is that any land-access program that targets
only farmers or ranchers of color may face delays from constitutional equal-
protection challenges. 317 I am also aware that, more practically, any outsid-
er’s definition of what solution might repair generations of racial injustice will
be—and should be—met with skepticism. I hear and echo Bernadette Atua-
hene’s important admonishment on reconciliation and reparations that solu-
tions must be imagined and designed by the impacted parties themselves. 318
Meanwhile, our choices about who owns rural America and agricultural
land more specifically shape the fortunes of rural places—economically, eco-
logically, and socially. Many of the beginning farmers who are now seeking
land access are immigrants, refugees, and racial and ethnic minorities. 319
Given the high (and increasing) numbers of farmworkers, existing tenant
farmers, and rural residents of color, land-access programs based on race-
316. This line can become difficult to draw. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v.
Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 574 (1997) (“A tax on real estate, like any other tax, may im-
permissibly burden interstate commerce.”). For now, however, it is enough to note that there is
scope for creative solutions here.
317. E.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990); Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995). On other hand, some scholars very persuasively argue
that racially integrative purposes are constitutional. E.g., Elise C. Boddie, The Constitutionality
of Racially Integrative Purpose, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 531 (2016).
318. Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New The-
oretical Framework for Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Required, 41
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 796, 818 (2016).
319. See supra Sections I.A, I.C; Calo & De Master, supra note 251, at 112–13.
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neutral factors—like preferences for former farmworkers and others with
farming experience—may achieve the goal of more equitable and diverse
landownership without explicitly race-based allocations. Certainly, there is
broader racial reparations work to do, but more equitable access to agricul-
tural land is also needed on its own.
c. Property System Change and Design
Finally, property change is possible but practically difficult. Property, in
general, is a creature of state law. Property reforms that proceed in an itera-
tive, experimental way through state-by-state efforts may best allow land-
tenure changes to adjust to specific farming, ecosystem, and community
contexts and needs. For example, land needs in the Midwest, where com-
modity row crops predominate, likely look very different than reforms in
New England, where agricultural land is much more sparse but urban popu-
lations and consumers are in much closer proximity for food distribution.
On the other hand, this state-by-state approach may mean some reforms
are slow to proceed or may not happen at all. Although I’ve written at length
elsewhere about the actual potential and value for more local pluralism in
property and the grassroots process needed to move the reform wheel, 320 in
general it is also true that standardization in property institutional design
can be a virtue to the extent it facilitates arm’s length transactions with lower
information costs involving valuable resources. 321 Thus, it is also worth not-
ing that the regularly renegotiated federal Farm Bill may provide another
lever for pushing property reforms at the federal level. The most recent Farm
Bill provides a sample of this kind of pressure for state-by-state—but uni-
form—property reforms. The Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act
(UPHPA) is model legislation specifically designed to address the risk of
forced partition sales of heir property by strengthening partition-in-kind
preferences and including more protective procedures for any actual parti-
tion sale that may occur. 322 The Farm Bill encouraged states to pass this re-
form by allowing for some preference in allocating federal-loan funds to
relending entities where the governing state has adopted the UPHPA. 323 A
320. Cf. Shoemaker, supra note 43 (exploring dynamics of property system change and range
of flexible property-reform options in context of retained Indigenous lands within reservations).
321. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law
of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 26–34, 38–42 (2000) (expressing
concerns about too many bespoke property interests creating market confusion and instead
seeking “optimal” standardization in property forms).
322. See generally Thomas W. Mitchell, Reforming Property Law to Address Devastating
Land Loss, 66 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2014) (analyzing aspects of partition law that contributed to the
loss of millions of acres of property and analyzing key sections of the UPHPA which seek to
address those problems).
323. Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-334, sec. 5104, § 310I(d)(2),
132 Stat. 4490, 4669–71 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1936c(d)(2)). This Farm Bill also references this
state-level property reform by providing an option for qualifying heir property owners without
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hybrid of this model—for example, Farm Bill incentives for land reforms and
experiments but without the specific uniformity obligations of the UPHPA
example—could put us in an ideal middle ground.
* * *
The ultimate goal is a series of property-law experiments that reconnect
land ownership and land experience; that distribute new opportunities equi-
tably and justly; and that allow for the kind of democratic, local engagement
and imagination that can rebuild so much of what is lost. In general, the
challenges of struggling rural communities, our rapidly changing climate,
and the spatial dimensions of economic and racial justice are often treated
discretely, but these challenges converge in this crisis of rural, agrarian land
tenure. 324 Fixing some of the fee simple’s failures, in some places, for the sake
of a more robust—and inclusive—rural prosperity has payoffs for all Ameri-
cans, and this is the kind of interest convergence that may actually get essen-
tial racial justice work done. 325
2. Specific Strategies
This final discussion centers on four specific strategies available to actu-
ally make these goals realities: setting new default property terms, designing
inclusionary zoning for agriculture, experimenting with modest initial land
distribution shifts, and imagining new off-the-shelf agricultural-tenure de-
signs. These are not the only possible strategies, of course, but they are of-
fered as kindling for greater consideration. Many of these following
strategies are already successfully deployed, or at least considered, in other
contexts and need only be reimagined for modern American agriculture. 326
a. Public Good Property Defaults
Early waves of housing justice advocacy effectively pursued new default
or opt-in terms for certain types of leases. The implied warranty of habitabil-
formal land titles to participate in some federal farm programs if they meet an alternative (and
onerous) set of requirements. Id. § 12615, 132 Stat. at 5014–15 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6622b).
324. For example, rural development professionals tend to focus on new strategies for
attracting and retaining new residents and businesses to declining rural places, but rural popu-
lations and communities are seismically shifted in large part as a result of global and macroe-
conomic forces beyond any one community’s control. Cf. Ann M. Eisenberg, Economic
Regulation and Rural America, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 737, 780–81 (2021) (making case for new
visions of agriculture for rural revitalization).
325. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
326. By design, these proposals focus on property-law innovations and options that have
heretofore largely been overlooked. Other reforms—from product-labeling strategies for mar-
keting purposes to other tax or antitrust law changes—could also, of course, be brought to bear
on these larger issues of inclusion and equity in agriculture.
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ity (IWH), for example, imposed mandatory housing-quality standards by
implying mandatory lease terms to that effect in all residential tenancies. 327
Rent-control statutes, meanwhile, set maximum rent returns for certain
leased properties to ensure long-term housing affordability. 328 In the context
of agricultural land-tenure reforms, a parallel strategy could focus on owner-
ship and leasing defaults to ensure more equitable and secure land access.
For example, to the extent that more minority farmers find themselves
in oral leasing arrangements, property law could easily define default terms for
those oral agricultural leases or, following the IWH, mandate certain provi-
sions. These imposed terms could define the following: how and when a lease
can be terminated, with secure protection for already-planted crops and re-
couping of certain improvements; water access; rent amounts and rent ad-
justments; and the allocation of various risks, from weather, disaster, insurance,
or otherwise. Similarly, new defaults could be pursued for other aspects of
agricultural landownership, like more expressly privileging a tenant’s agricul-
tural production when defining co-owners’ rights within a default co-
ownership form. There is tremendous, largely untapped, possibility for flexible
adjustments of property relationships within both leases and co-ownerships.
At numerous other junctures in the legal system, there are similar op-
portunities to build in new incentives or policies that favor greater and more
equitable land transitions. For example, specialized intestacy defaults can be
created for farmland that encourage more public-good transfers—or, in the
absence of a desire for such a transition, achieve more active planning by
motivating farmers to plan specifically. For example, with adequate notice
and opportunities to opt out, it is not unreasonable to imagine an intestacy
default that includes first-refusal rights for a nonprofit or land trust with a
farmland-preservation and access-supporting mission. 329 Similar first-refusal
or other priority rights could also be recognized in the same nonprofits or
other public agencies serving socially disadvantaged beginning farmers upon
any foreclosure of existing agricultural lands, whether for tax or other reasons.
Finally, an entirely different set of immediate default responses could fo-
cus not on land acquisitions but rather, at least for now, on how better to se-
327. See Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23
B.C. L. REV. 503, 528–29 (1982).
328. See Andrea J. Boyack, Responsible Devolution of Affordable Housing, 46 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1183, 1210–12 (2019).
329. Cf. Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its
Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1032–33 (2004) (calling for more scholarly attention to
system of intestacy defaults). The Supreme Court has previously rejected probate reforms that
effectively abolish a landowner’s entire right to descent or devise of property, but this still
leaves a range of policy tools available to enhance land access through intestacy defaults. Cf.
Michelle M. Lindo, Note, Youpee v. Babbitt—The Indian Land Inheritance Problem Revisited,
22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 223, 239–46 (1997) (collecting range of available law reform tools). The
American Indian Probate Reform Act, for example, gives tribal governments and certain oth-
ers with qualifying connections to the land a right to purchase certain small interests in trust
allotments that would otherwise pass via intestate succession. 25 U.S.C. § 2206(o)(5)(A).
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cure and maintain what farmers and ranchers of color do currently own. 330
For example, this could focus on legal reforms to reduce the “geography tax”
of lack of access to legal services, which could facilitate farmers better avail-
ing themselves of estate planning, probate, formal real-estate transactions,
and all the associated farm credit and support programs. For farmers, this
can often require, for example, adjustments to free-legal-service eligibility
guidelines because farm assets (without regard to debt) can sometimes ren-
der farmers unfairly ineligible. 331 Other efforts could focus on simplifying
the legal processes themselves to facilitate, for example, formalization of ex-
isting informal property titles. Bold ideas include modifying adverse-
possession law to allow in-possession co-owners to, with notice, extinguish
the lingering claims of outsider and absentee co-owners, and more modest
reforms may focus on simplifying self-help probate procedures for small or
uncontested estates. Bankruptcy courts, dormant-interest registration re-
quirements, and even stronger eviction protections for tenant farmers could
also facilitate this adjacent goal of greater land security for existing but vul-
nerable owners.
b. Inclusive Zoning for Agriculture
In the housing justice context, inclusionary zoning has been used to en-
sure the creation of more affordable housing. 332 Inclusionary zoning in the
housing context refers generally to programs or policies that require or incen-
tivize the creation of new units of affordable housing—usually as a condition
of a development permit when new housing is built or by requiring a payment
in lieu of development along the zoning process. 333 The basic idea is that
owners who seek to benefit from a public system of city infrastructure and ser-
vices, particularly at the moment of imposing a new development, should
also contribute directly to the larger project of housing for all in that space. A
similar model could be drafted to make farmland more accessible. For exam-
ple, certain large or absentee agricultural landlords could be tasked with leasing a
defined portion of their farmlands to socially disadvantaged beginning farmers
at affordable rates or, at certain junctures, to contribute a land-use exaction to
a public fund used to support these new farmer entrants in another way.
Many different iterations of this new program could be imagined, with
variations both in terms of triggers and effects. These inclusionary obliga-
tions could kick in as conditions of participation in certain farm programs—
such as the extremely valuable federally subsidized crop-insurance pro-
gram—or at the time of certain changes in ownership or operation. Effects
330. See McFarlane, supra note 254, at 914–18 (discussing “right to keep” proposal).
331. Carpenter, supra note 33, at 94 n.51.
332. Emily Thaden & Ruoniu Wang, Inclusionary Housing in the United States: Preva-
lence, Impact, and Practices (Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Working Paper No. WP17ET1, 2017),
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep18611 [https://perma.cc/WA7Z-X6U7].
333. See Weiss, supra note 274, at 263.
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could range, again, from contributions to funds to an actual lease or other
access mechanism for a portion of the subject land. Under Fifth Amendment
principles, such a program would have to be carefully constructed. The Su-
preme Court has never fully resolved the exact permissible parameters of
other inclusionary zoning programs, but they are prevalent in the United
States, with one recent study finding more than 1,379 such policies in 791
different jurisdictions. 334 Supreme Court jurisprudence on exactions gener-
ally would require both a nexus between any inclusionary agriculture policy
and the impacted owners, as well as rough proportionality between the size
of the demand and the magnitude of the impacted party’s original develop-
ment or other request. 335
c. Experimental Land Reforms
The most radical reform would involve some small experiments with ac-
tual land redistribution. Although certain to provoke a political controversy,
legally this option is not as outlandish as it may first seem. The Supreme
Court has previously agreed that eminent domain can be used to break up con-
solidated land holdings “when a sufficiently large number of persons declare
that they are willing but unable to buy lots at fair prices.”336 The Court in Ha-
waii Housing Authority v. Midkiff deferred to the legislative branch as “the
main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation.” 337
Others have proposed using this Midkiff precedent to redistribute rural
property for “progressive, social justice ends.” 338 Guadalupe Luna, for exam-
ple, has argued for redistributing federal public lands to “Chicanas/Chicanos”
to “arrest their continued alienation from the agrarian domain or rural land-
ownership.” 339 Her proposal includes several novel suggestions, including
imposing a condition subsequent on any actual land grants requiring that
the former public lands be managed by the new owners using sustainable-
334. Thaden & Wang, supra note 332, at 14.
335. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER, THOMAS E. ROBERTS, PATRICIA E. SALKIN &
RYAN MAX ROWBERRY, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW §10:5, at
421–24 (4th ed. 2018).
336. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984). The statute at issue in
Midkiff was the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967, ch. 307, 1967 Haw. Sess. Laws 488 (codified
as amended at HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 516-1 to -204 (2018)).
337. 467 U.S. at 239 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)). More recently, in
Kelo v. City of New London, the Court affirmed the use of eminent domain to take private
property for part of a larger development plan that included transferring the acquired land to
new owners, including both low-income tenants and private businesses. 545 U.S. 469, 498 (2005).
338. E.g., David Linhart, Note, Eminent Domain Conversion of Vacant Luxury Condo-
miniums into Low-Income Housing, 21 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 129, 131–32 (2011) (citing proposal
by New York City chapter of the Right to the City Alliance to use eminent domain to seize va-
cant residential buildings in the city and turn them into affordable housing); Eric Young &
Kery Kamita, Comment, Extending Land Reform to Leasehold Condominiums in Hawaiʻi, 14
U. HAW. L. REV. 681, 682 (1992).
339. Luna, supra note 131, at 138.
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agriculture practices, building on cultural histories of place-sensitive agricul-
tural practices. 340 She also suggests a land trust “to offset the enormous costs
of initiating an agricultural enterprise.”341 Celebrity chef Mark Bittman also
recently delivered a keynote address seeking “sweeping land-reform policy,
one that would allow the federal government to appropriate farmland and
redistribute it to young farmers, as part of inheritance or transfer tax reform,”
and the proposal was also supported by Ricardo Salvador, a senior scientist
for food and agriculture at the Union of Concerned Scientists.342 Elsewhere,
even without any exercise of eminent domain, many states already own land
that is underutilized but has food-growing potential. 343
Others have considered whether a new modern version of the historic
Homestead Act might facilitate rural resettlement. 344 Some rural towns have
given land to families willing to build homes there. 345 Federal legislation was
proposed—but not passed—in the early 2000s called the New Homestead
Act which, rather than actually transferring land, would have encouraged
rural wealth building in counties impacted by out-migration with tools like
loan forgiveness for residents, tax credits, and matched-savings vehicles,
modeled on Individual Development Account ideas. 346
Challenges to any redistribution plan would include deciding difficult
questions about which lands to pursue (by what ownership characteristics, in
what locations, at what stage of development, in what transition, and for
what compensation) and exactly how to redistribute (which harm precisely
is being addressed and who should benefit and how). In general, politically
progressive subsidy or taxation or stricter enforcement of antitrust principles
tends to be more palatable than actual land redistribution. Yet, elsewhere in
the world, similar reforms are being explored—including, for example, a
340. Id. at 139–40.
341. Id. at 140.
342. Sam Bloch & Hillary Bonhomme, Young Black Farmers to Mark Bittman: We Don’t
Need Your Land Reform, COUNTER (Dec. 7, 2017, 7:14 PM), https://thecounter.org/young-
black-farmers-mark-bittman-land-reform [https://perma.cc/8YBY-THBN]. But anger broke
out in the conference when Bittman failed to answer adequately how he personally holds him-
self accountable to communities of color. Id. Related to this discussion is arguably greater at-
tention recently to the case for African American reparations. See, e.g., Ta-Nehisi Coates, The
Case for Reparations: An Intellectual Autopsy, ATLANTIC (May 22, 2014), https://www.theatlantic
.com/business/archive/2014/05/the-case-for-reparations-an-intellectual-autopsy/371125 [https://
perma.cc/Q5KX-SFT5]. Another project, the Black-Indigenous Farmers Reparations Map, has
sought to encourage individual “people-to-people” reparations, with at least some success. See
Jean Willoughby, A Digital Map Leads to Reparations for Black and Indigenous Farmers, YES!
(Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.yesmagazine.org/social-justice/2018/02/21/a-digital-map-leads-to-
reparations-for-black-and-indigenous-farmers [https://perma.cc/8MYK-BKCT]. The project itself
lists specific farms organized by people of color and seeks funding for them. See id.
343. ACKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 66.
344. Williams Shanks, supra note 156, at 10–12.
345. See BAILEY ET AL., supra note 86, at 8–9.
346. Id. at 58–59; see also New Homestead Act of 2003, S. 602, 108th Cong. (2003).
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carefully constrained community-purchase option in Scotland. 347 In the
United States, small experiments with breaking up large land monopolies—
or small pieces of large monopolies—could facilitate more public farm incu-
bators and transitional new-farmer opportunities to start. For now, however,
especially in the face of growing consolidation, the point is that such a legal
tool—carefully and cautiously applied—is possible.
d. New Agricultural Tenures
Finally, whether post-redistribution or simply as a new default form to
facilitate more expedited and efficient future private transfers, states also
have wide flexibility to innovate and design new default property estates for
agricultural land. Original fee simple features, from its endlessness to its ab-
stract divisibility of profit and investment rights, have not served rural
America well—at least not as the singular option and at least not from the
perspective of those who are persistently excluded. Property is much more
pluralistic than we may at first perceive, and there are numerous examples of
adaptive property institutions based on the unique characteristics of specific
resources—from intellectual property to water law to, in some cases, even
agrarian lands internationally. 348 A final set of reforms, then, would build to
a new set of default property estates for some agricultural lands, reflecting
the outputs of real laboratories of local democracy and the “intrinsic com-
plexity” of land itself. 349
For example, for any given parcel of agricultural land, a new estate could
provide for an underlying public, charitable, or cooperative title with subsid-
iary strata-like producer rights on top. These producer rights may have a
formula to limit endlessness—either a calendar period of time (such as ten-
year renewable terms) or the working life of one farmer, or they could im-
pose defeasibility on defined conditions (for instance, until the current pro-
ducer stops actively using the land in an agreed manner). This estate could
prohibit disaggregation and absenteeism, with active use and possession re-
quirements also informing natural parcel-size limits and precluding over-
concentration. Likewise, depending on the context of a particular land
resource, overlapping or concurrent uses based on seasons, rotating crops or
livestock, and multiple-yield farming practices could be coordinated and
shared by a network of stakeholders. Grazing rights, forage rights, and spe-
cific crop options could be layered across numerous sequential users. The
347. UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 190, at 121 (expressing greater social acceptance of re-
distributing money through policies than of any redistribution of land).
348. See Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 869,
912–13 (2013) (exploring history of agrarian-specific land reforms in the 1940s and 1950s in
Italy); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1409–27
(2009) (exploring numerous examples of potential property innovations not only with regard
to exclusion but also along a spectrum of free to more restricted alienability).
349. See generally Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009) (em-
phasizing “intrinsic complexity” of land and need to reconcile numerous values in land decisions).
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new tenure models may include cooperative or other equitable governance
models for polycentric management across shared landscapes.
Various other matters need to be considered, of course. The strength
and alienability of any producer rights would have to be carefully balanced—
allowing transfers, for example, under conditions that allow for future
maintenance of shared use and possession goals and the continuation of any
valuable personal or familial attachments, while also allowing for the accu-
mulation and “cashing out” of some portion of an owner’s wealth and equity
and sufficient transferability to facilitate accessing necessary credit, including
in something like a leasehold mortgage.
The primary purpose here is to begin to imagine how flexible property
can be. A new estate offers flexibility but also the information-cost savings
and efficiency of a new default structure. Rather than requiring individual
trusts and leases or business and nonprofit entities to be created and negoti-
ated in complex, bespoke ways, new default tenure forms allow collective
choices about property values to inform how land is used and how commu-
nities are structured—even just in small, pilot parcels to start. Those value
choices were critical to the original agrarian objectives, and we can still
achieve a better and more inclusive version of these ideals today.
CONCLUSION
Property plays just one part in this complex system, but it is an im-
portant part. People of color are dramatically underrepresented in rural
landowner classes and in agricultural landownership in particular, despite
evidence that many members of these groups desire to enter farming as
owners and operators. Many of these emergent new farmers also seek to in-
novate with smaller and more diverse operations of the kind that may be
needed to transform current agriculture systems and bolster the future of
otherwise dwindling rural communities and rural livelihoods. With so much
land expected to transition from current-generation owners in the next dec-
ade, a fundamental reworking of these land-tenure systems may be a now-
or-never opportunity.
Using the racial legacies and current systems of racial exclusion as a
through thread, this Article fundamentally argues for turning our attention
back to these forgotten places. The goal is not to recreate old systems or pre-
serve the status quo. The historic origins here are not to be exalted. But at a
moment of radical social, economic, and environmental change, property
law has an important part to play in reimagining the future of these places.
The challenge is complex, but we can imagine—and create—systems wholly
different from what we have now.
